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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
A COMPARISON OF NORTH KOREA WITH CZECH REPUBLIC AND 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOCUSED ON ECONOMIC REFORMS IN BOTH 
COUNTRIES 
 
By 
 
Radim Vaculovic 
 
  
North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and Czech Republic or 
Czechoslovakia - is it possible to compare these two countries? Is there anything what is 
common for both countries? Many people will answer to this question probably „NOT“. 
Czech Republic is the country in the middle of Europe, (the Capital – Prague is very 
often called „the heart of Europe“), which quite successfully transferred social planned 
economy to market economy. North Korea is on the other hand a country with very 
central planned economy in North East Asia, where to talk about market economy is 
something not really possible.  So two countries – no geographical connection, (the 
geographical distance between the two countries is about 8.000 km), no economic 
connection, each of the state is really in total different pole. Well if a person is satisfied 
with this explanation it is true there is probably not so much common and these two 
countries are not really comparable. 
But I have bit different opinion. I allege that if we think about it very carefully 
and very deeply there are so much common between the two countries.  I am not saying 
that Czech Republic is the best and only possible country for comparison with North 
Korea. No. But I think I have quite good arguments, which I hope can pursue a reader of 
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this paper that comparison of these two countries is possible and may be quite useful for 
future development of North Korea.  But to make this comparison more realistic and try 
to find higher correlation I will compare not only North Korea with Czech Republic, but 
I plan to put quite much emphasis on the comparison between North Korea and 
Czechoslovakia, former Czech Republic. 
  My goal is to compare these two countries because there are lots of similarities, 
which makes the comparison possible. Czechoslovakia and KLDR had very similar 
initial conditions, similar type of governments, similar reforms, which they made, and 
similar dependency on Soviet Union etc. I want to build up this paper on these 
similarities.  
I would like to divide this paper into three main parts. In the first part I want to 
briefly talk about North Korean history from year 1945 till now and about the reforms, 
which North Korea introduced during that time.  In history overview I want to focus on 
the main ideology which North Korean took and on the main strategies which the 
country used. When I will talk about reforms, which DPRK took in past, I will write 
mostly about North Korean reform from July 1st 2002. This reform is the most crucial in 
latest history and can have significant effect on the country.  
Second part of thesis is focused on Czechoslovakia and Czech Republic. The 
second part will look at the beginning on Czechoslovakian history from 1945 till now. 
In this historic overview I will try to focus on the ideology which Czechoslovakia took 
and on the most important points in the history, which had crucial effect on the events in 
Czechoslovakia. In this part I will also look on the reforms, which Czechoslovakia took 
during the periods. I will focus mostly on three reforms – reform from 1965 - 1968, 
reform from 1980-1987 and reform from 1989 till now. 
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In my third part I will try to find similarities between the two countries first. As 
it will be seen from first and second part North Korea and Czechoslovakia had for 
example central planned economy, one main communistic party, which leaded actually 
the country. Both countries had economy mostly oriented to heavy industry, similar 
natural resources - both countries had quite much of coal; none of the countries has 
noticeable resources of crude oil and was fully depended on Soviet support of the crude 
oil. Soviet Union and his support toward the planned economies were for both 
economies very important. Both countries used five or seven years plans for their 
economy and for both of the countries is similar that at the beginning (after second 
World War) they fulfilled the plan quite successfully but later on,  the economy had 
started to slow down. Both of the countries put high emphasis on social subsidy. Free 
medication, free school system, very cheap basic food and free holidays are just 
examples of these subsidies. These are just few examples of similarities which I am 
going to talk about. 
As the next step I will try to compare the North Korean reform from 2002 with 
Czechoslovakian reforms between 1945 and 1989.  Are there comparable? I believe so. 
What the Communistic party in Czechoslovakia did in 1960ties and between and 
1980ties is quite similar what did North Korea in summer 2002. For each step which 
introduced NK in 2002 I will try to find out similar step in the Czechoslovakian reforms 
and upon Czechoslovakian experiences I will try to predict the effect of the NK reform. 
Can we predict upon Czechoslovakia history what will be the future development in 
North Korea?  Will the Kim Jong-Il regime terminate and how? Is it reasonable to 
expect Korean Unification and what should be done if yes?  I will try to answer these 
questions at the end of my paper. Of course any predictions about NK have certain 
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limitation, because the regime is quite unpredictable. I will try to find out what the 
limits are and what we can expect.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 There are several reasons why I have chosen these countries to compare. At the 
beginning I wanted to compare Czech and Slovak economy – but after I was thinking 
the entire problem over very deeply I have found that I would like to try to find some 
more challenging topic – so I have chosen comparison of North Korea and Czech 
Republic. The reason for choosing Czech Republic is quite obvious – I am from the 
Czech Republic – so I know about this country, its problems and economy quite much. 
North Korea – I have been interested in that country for quite a long time. At this time it 
is really one of the unique and most scraggy regimes in the world.  Because I grew up in 
the communistic country, I think I can see, understand and imagine from my outside 
understanding view what is going on in North Korea during these days.  
I have been interested in North Korean state from the year 1997, when I took 
some lectures about North Korea at my university. In year 2002, after three years 
waiting for my visa to North Korea, I finally got approved and had a chance to visit this 
communistic country for two weeks. Who ever visited North Korea in last years and had 
the chance to look bit around and had the chance to speak with some North Koreans 
would say the same as me – it is unbelievable, unique, and indescribable. Even If I have 
read so many materials and papers about North Korea, even I have spoken with several 
people who had the chance to visit North Korea, the reality what I saw still surprised me 
so much and I was fascinated by many things there.  
  So because I think I know a bit about this country now and it is one of my 
hobbies I have chosen for comparison the Czech Republic and Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea. I have also welcomed that because of researching for this paper I 
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had to read many new papers and other materials about North Korea and have obtained 
so much new information about the country.  
      
PART I.   
I.A. OVERVIEW OF NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY 1945 - 1981 
This overview is describing the North Korean economy from the year 1945 till 
now. (The current situation is described in third part after comparison of reforms.) For 
the first period - till 1957 is very characteristic the economic development through Post 
– Korean War rehabilitation.  
 After the Second World War, the Korea can be characterized as agriculture – in 
the South accounted around 60% and mining and manufacturing in North - accounted 
about 43%. On per capita basis the North was much more productive than South. The 
North had the advantage of mineral natural resources. In North there were about 200 
types of minerals, including the largest magnesite inventory in the world. The North had 
also much bigger electric power potential. About 92 per cent of all electric power was 
made in North – so the conditions for creating enterprises were quite favorable in North 
Korea. 
 After the Japanese left the land of North Korea, there was quite bit chaos. The 
Japanese monopolized during their stay there much of the industries, so suddenly after 
the Japanese left there was shortage of qualified skilled manpower. One of the first 
reforms which the communists introduced after they got to power was a land reform. 
Korean believed that it is the most important issue, which had to be solved as first and 
as soon as possible.  It was very quick. Generally lands owned by the Japanese, Korean 
landlords, temples and others were confiscated and were given to farm laborers, landless 
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peasant and those who owned only small plots of land. This reform brought end to the 
existence of landlord class. The reason for that I believe was to erase the differences 
between classes and demonstrate toward Japanese that the country was in Korean hands 
and there was no way to change it back.  But it was only the beginning.  
 Another reform were preparing for major industries.  Generally all private 
industry properties were confiscated and under the Soviet supervision were transferred 
to North Korean People Committee. In 1946 the socialistic regime controlled over 72 
per cent of all industrial output. The first year after the war can be characterized as a 
chaos and production decline. The reasons can be seen in very quick reforms and 
shortage of skilled people. But the situation was improving quite rapidly. The Soviet 
Union financial assistance but also Soviet human recourses helped the Korea so much 
during those years.  So in 1949 the Korean production was only about 5 per cent smaller 
than in 1940. Also in other sectors the situation was getting better. It means the recovery 
looked pretty good.  But Korean War came. 
 The Korean War really destroyed the North part of the country. The total 
damage was about 420 billion Won. It was about 4 times more than the North Korean 
GNP in 1953. More than 8.5 thousand factories, 600 thousands house units were 
destructed.  
To recover the economy from this tragic situation, the North Korean politicians 
established the first 3-year plan for the period 1954-1956. The main goal of the plan 
was to restore the production to the level of year 1949. It is very important to write now, 
that very characteristic for post war period was that North Korea put so much emphasis 
on self-reliance. In the vision of North Korea leader, Korea should change to totally 
socialistic oriented economy.  
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There were three main goals during post war period.  Firstly Korea wanted to 
develop heavy industry. Secondly NK wanted to transform small-scale agriculture 
economy to socialistic economy through collectivization. Finally the country wanted to 
implement of socialistic labor competition campaigns to motivate population.   At Sixth 
Plenum of the Central Committee of the North Korea Workers Party in 1953 was also 
approved the most importance of heavy oriented industry. The vision was to develop 
heavy industry first while to create simultaneously rapid growth and development of 
light industry and agriculture.  How important the heavy industry was can illustrate the 
percentage of investment money, which were put into heavy industry – it was about 80 
per cent. Korea could not achieve this number without assistance from other countries.  
The helper number „one“was as well as before war Soviet Union.  By that help USSR 
wanted to create great influence on Korean Peninsula.  Not only the USSR, but also 
other Eastern European countries were sending their experts to North Korea.  
Thousands of North Koreans studied abroad – again mostly in USSR and tried to learn 
how the socialistic economy works. The import from the helpers was mostly oriented to 
production rather than consumption – 46% were machinery and equipment, 27% raw 
material and fuel, and only about 10 per cent were consumer’s goods.   
The period till 1960 is characterized by rapid growth and fulfills the plans, 
which were set up. But the question is what would happen if there was no support from 
socialistic block countries? South, which had no comparable support, did much worse 
during that period. So we can guess that the result for North would be also worse if 
there was no help from communistic block. But theoretically the North performance 
would be probably better than South Korean performance anyway, because of better 
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initial conditions, such as existence of heavy industry, huge natural resources, better 
technology etc. (Table1).  
 Beginning in 1960 serious problems began to impede development. Bottlenecks 
were pervasive and generally were created by the lack of arable land, skilled labor, 
energy and deficiencies in the extractive industries. The first seven-year plan changed 
the focus of the industrialization.  Heavy industry was still given the priority number 
one. But at the same time there was a focus on innovation technology, improvements of 
national welfare and building up military - industry complex.  But during this time the 
economy slowed down and in year 1967 it was seen that the plan is not possible to meet. 
So the plan was exceed for another three years.  Mostly during this extension the 
economy was also focused on military - industry complex because of situation in South 
Korea and also the escalation between USA a NK. So finally the necessity of the goals 
diversification was as the North Koreans argued the main reason why the seven years 
plan failed. 
 Right after the plan was met were about to start the Six Year Plan (1971 – 1976). 
The targets were set up bit lower than previous plan also because of poor performance 
of previous plan.  This plan emphasized more technological advance, self - sufficiency 
in industry raw materials, improving product quality, correcting imbalance among 
different sectors and developing the power and extractive industries. The plan called for 
attaining a self-sufficiency rate above 60% in all industrial sectors by substituting 
domestic raw material wherever possible and by organizing and renovating technical 
processes to make substitution feasible. The self-sufficiency was very important for 
military industry.  The plan again did not really make any importance towards 
consumers. Also light industry and agriculture were not the main goal.  The country 
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took the self-sufficiency way. But for this attitude it is necessary to have some financial 
resources, which should be used to finance this. But these did not really exist. Actually 
only domestic agriculture surplus was able to finance the self-sufficient program but 
there were not enough money. The regime knew it and also knew it needed hard 
currency. One way how to get it was in organizing special working plans which were 
called “To earn the dollars for Kim Il–sung.” Because of these “special actions” 
thousands of people were pushed to work extra shifts, which would create extra goods, 
which could be export in exchange for hard currency.  Important sources of North 
Korean hard currency were a gold and wild ginseng.      
Officially this plan was fulfilled about one year ahead of schedule, so the next 
plan could start from 1976. But unfortunately new plan was not realized till the 1978. 
The simplest question is:  Why not in 1976 but two years later in 1978? One of the 
possible explanation is that even it was officially announced the plan was fulfill in 
reality it was not true.  The officials knew it so they had to wait with new plan the old 
was really done.   
Second Seven Years plan (1978 – 1984) had three main goals – self – reliance, 
modernization and scientific.  Self-reliance was not new, Modernization – the North 
Korean hoped to   increase through that mechanization and automation in all sectors.  
Scientific means adoption of new manager techniques. Another goal was the education 
– the eleven years compulsory educations were supposed to create more quality 
technicians, mechanicals and automatic engineers. The plan was not successfully 
fulfilled. National income was after that not even published. 10 million tons of grain 
production was finally done but only five others commodities from plan target were 
fulfilled.  The official numbers, which presented NK about this plan, has not been 
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actually very doubtful. The reality was probably much worse which may indicate also 
that the next plan was not realized for another 2 years. 
The Third Seven Years plan (1987 – 1993) did not bring anything-special new or 
new orientation of economy. It actually rather repeated the goals from previous plans – 
self-reliance, modernization, scientific.  Economic growth was set up only 7.9% (lower 
than previous plan).  Target for steel was dramatically reduced other exporting targets 
were increased. Plan, indicating that it would again depend on capital and technology 
from developed countries for its economic development. The plan wanted also to 
increase the standard of living and consumer needs. But again the prospectus of 
reaching the goals set, at the outset of the plan appeared grim. Rather, North Korea 
economy seemed had been experiencing serious crisis, generally attributable to 
structural causes.  
First, having reached the stage of semi developed socialist country; North Korea 
must enlarge the role of equipment and technology over mobilization of labor. Yet it 
still maintained old facilities and backward technology. Second, North Korea‘s huge 
military expenditure have inhibited its economic development. Third, the emphases of 
juche ideology and strategy have certainly damaged North Korea’s economic potential. 
The final cause is collapse of formal socialistic countries, which removed major North 
Korea’s economic partners. (Table 2, 3.) 
 After this plan was finished no other plans were released. This can be explained 
as following: First: The plans have been not doubtful any more. Second: North Korean 
had found out that planning was not the best way how to lead the economy and how to 
make its growth.  I am not talking only about the efficiency of planning. It is quite 
obvious and many macro economists have already proved that the planning is not the 
 18
best most efficient way of leading economy and creating the highest social value.     I 
am talking that perilous planning followed by failure of the plan. I think the regime  
found out that it might be danger for the regime and it would be much safer do not 
create any plans any more. If a new plan starts two years after the old one is met people 
may try to start to ask: Why that late? Is something hiding there? Can we trust our 
leaders? These questions, actually the answers may be quite danger for the regime. So it 
is better not give a chance to people to raise these questions.     Even more there is no 
other country to compete with in planning and fulfilling the plan. 
  
 I.B. 1981 – 1995 OPENING OF THE ECONOMY   
At the beginning of eighties the economy was going to deeper and deeper 
trouble.  Poor quality of goods, which were not really competitive, shortage of export, 
shortage of hard currency, low efficiency and productive of company, industry which 
demanded extremely lots of energy, short of new technology, impossibility to obtain 
foreign debt  - that are just few of problems which Korean economy in 1980ies had. It 
was more than clear that something has to be done, at least some partial reform, 
something that would bring more hard currency to the state, some reform, which would 
increase the poor efficiency of North Korean economy. North Korea introduced some 
very small partial reform, which was supposed to attract foreign investors. But because 
of very poor quality of the reform, it did not happen. Few years later, Kim-Il sung came 
with other partial reform, mostly focused on changing of enterprises planning strategies. 
But nor this partial reform did not helped North Korean economy (Table 4.)   
 The fall of communism regime in Eastern Europe but mostly in Soviet Union 
was just another disaster for North Korea economy (Chart1.)Year 1991 was a year of 
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very serious economic crisis.  Economy, which life was very closely connected to 
USSR special their import of crude oil, machinery and other resources needed for the 
enterprises, had much more serious difficulty.  The import from Soviet Union in 1991 
was about 70 per cent lower than previous year.  Especially the situation with energy 
started to be very critical. The import of oil decreased from 440,000 tons of crude oil in 
1990 to only 40,000 in 1991. Recently the USSR provided oil to North Korea at 
“fraternal „price, raised this to standard international price.  Russia also requested that 
North Korea would pay in US dollars rather than in barter (graph 2.) Also China 
informed North Korea of new Chinese trade policy of hard currency settlement.   
 The production of coal was extremely expensive because of self-reliance attitude. 
Simply everything was depending on coal. So it was more than sure that again 
something has to be done.   
 North Korea introduced new partial reform, which was supposed again to create 
special economic zones, similar to Chinese ones. But again the results were poor. In 
1996 total investments of 350 millions USD were made only. The economy did not 
improved significantly.  For the period between 1995 and 2001 the economy did not 
show anything significant. The state closed as much as possible and the economy still 
declined.  In 1996 the GDP per capita was about 1,000 USD, in 2001 less than 800 USD. 
In year 2002 North Korea introduced the biggest reform ever. It has changed price 
system, hard currency exchange rate, planning strategy and many other things.  If it 
would solve North Korean economy problem from long-term view is not clear at the 
moment but the true is that the economy is growing up now.  
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PART II. 
NORTH KOREAN REFORMS 
 Between 1953 and 2002 North Korea introduced several reforms as I have 
already mentioned. The most important and biggest reform was introduced in year 2002, 
but also in 1980ties and 1990ties were introduced some partial reforms which I would 
like to briefly talk about now. 
 
II.A. REFORMS IN 1980ties   
  In 1980ties North Korea wanted to improve its economic performance through 
various measures including foreign trade expansion. As the industrialization policy 
relying on the expansion of foreign trade with the West in the 1980ties was short of 
expectation and sector imbalances in industry simultaneously became aggravated, North 
Korea adopted some reform measures. The year 1982 can be settled as the real break in 
North Korean thinking. It was the year where first reform in North Korea was 
introduced.  The Koreans found out that the economy went down and some steps had to 
be done to improve it again. It can be said that 180 per cent turnover was made.  Till the 
beginning of 1980ties the importance of juche ideology - self-reliance was number one.  
But in mid 1980ties the North Korean decided to attract foreign direct investments and 
change this attitude. The self-reliance way was just too expensive and was not able to be 
financed by the government any more.  There was shortage of hard currency.  In 
January 1984, when the Supreme People’s Assembly passed the resolution “On further 
Strengthening South – South Cooperation and External Economic Work and Further 
Developing Foreign Trade,” the country called for economic transaction even with 
capitalistic countries, with who has not yet established diplomatic relations. Later that 
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year – in September 1984 the new Joint Venture Law was promulgated.  North Korea 
wanted to establish new Joint Ventures with foreigner investors. They wanted to attract 
mostly investors from Japan and South Korea who had relatives in NK or were born in 
NK. But at the time they really did not took its reform seriously.  The reform was just 
too small, too partial. Without systematic linkage between domestic and external 
economy and meaningful price system in North Korea, however, other than earning 
some hard currency, such limited approach to the expansion of foreign economic 
relationship could not be expected to assume a positive economic rule.   
 The politicians probably believed that everybody wanted to invest in North 
Korea and it would be very easy to attract the investors.  North Korean had experiences 
only from social planned economy, where was quite easy to establish any industry 
anywhere. The government just decided which enterprise would be where and the 
problem was solved. The efficiency was secondary problem. But it was not possible to 
attract Japanese or South Korean investors by the same way how North Korea decided 
for example about a Joint venture with Soviet Union enterprises. Some experts say that 
because of lack of business experiences and knowledge they made a plan, which did not 
attract foreign investors at all.  The foreign investors just did not want to accept the 
North’s own style of management guided by the principle of establishing a self – reliant 
nation economy within the basic framework of the command economy. The lack of 
private property guarantee law, the low trustful of Korean politician, the Korean way in 
which they wanted to manage these joint ventures – these were the biggest problems. 
North Korea was simply still very unfavorable investment environment. So in 
conclusion at that, it was not really a reform of industry, but rather wishes for a reform.  
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 Few months later, another reform measure was called by leader Kim. On 
August 1984 the Leader emphasized an increase in the supply of consumer goods by 
means “tapping and using by product, waste materials, and other inner reserves.” 
Consumer goods produced under the program were allowed to be sold through 
something like a free market mechanism. But the program could only be an attempt to 
squeeze some consumer goods out of an industrial structure. That is geared to heavy 
industry, reflecting a continuing unwillingness to reallocate investment resources from 
heavy to light industry. It looked more like mobilizing the untapped local resources 
rather than an attempt to utilizing any market mechanism, since it was designed to keep 
any deviations from central planning system within carefully monitored limits.  
The country also tried to reorganize all the industrial management and tried to 
change the way of planning for individual enterprises. The government centrally 
stopped with financing the enterprises and all enterprises if they wanted capital, they 
should asked the national bank for borrowing. Double independent accounting system 
was established. North Korean enterprises because of new independent accounting 
system were permitted more independent decision about the mix of production factors 
and were allowed to retain apart of excess profits for the expansion of production, 
welfare and bonuses. But this applied only to production inputs and not to decision 
regarding products, prices and marketing. In reality the huge bureaucracy still existed.  
The bureaucracies authorized to assign workers to specific job sites, allocate equipment 
and material, and distribute funds to enterprises. That independent accounting system 
could not independently accounted for the economic performance of an enterprise.  
   
II.B. REFORMS IN 1990ties 
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 The revolutionary transformation of the socialistic countries and China 
aggressive moved toward openness and market – oriented economy, left North Korea 
alone.  Korea got to a very serious trouble and its response was to more aggressively 
pursue the opening of its economy.  In emulated the Chinese strategy of opening special 
economic zones and adopted an economic strategy emphasizing three priorities such as 
agriculture, light industry and foreign trade.  
 North Korea wanted to develop the Najin and Sondong Free Economic and 
Trade Zone. (The main reason for establishing any special economic zones in a market 
economy is to provide some advantages for foreigners’ investors, who wish to come to 
that zone.  The typical example can be favorable taxable environment or providing 
needed social overhead capital facilities. Establishing a zone means also application of 
market prices, separation of management and ownership of state – owned enterprises 
financial and tax reform etc. This did not happen in DPRK.) North Korea took the 
inspiration for its Najin and Sondong zone in Chinese special economic zones, but did 
not copy everything, but only certain parts of the zones. The North Korean attitude 
towards these special economic zones was in 1990ties much better than in 1980ties, but 
still so far behind China. Chinese economic zones were in that time doing quite well 
and NK believed they might compete with them. But honestly, was it possible to 
compete with them? Actually some of the condition for the economic zones, which were 
set up by Koreans, for example tax rate, were better than conditions in China, but in 
summary the North Korean economic zone was not able to compete at all. Chinese were 
prepared to open the economy and introduced some market principle. North Korean did 
not.  They did not want to change the whole socialistic system. They wanted something, 
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which would bring them money but at the same time would let them to lead the state 
without any changes.   
 It is true that the DPRK changed because of this special economic zone 20 law 
and regulation and guaranteed that the new investors could wholly owned a firm within 
the zone and permitted them to assign and mortgage the land rented to them for a period 
of up to 50 years but it was not enough. Also the structure of the economy was not in 
good proportion for the reform (graph 3.) The state did not have enough credibility to 
trust that the private rights would be in real life guaranteed.  The true was that North 
Koreans did not have a clue what these economics zones really needed and what had to 
be done and what could not be avoided. They believed they could make its own special 
economic zones, but the reality showed them it was not possible.  According to North 
Korea source, total foreign investment in the North as of the end of January 1996 
amounted to 350 million dollars for 33 cases on a contract basis and 20 million dollars 
on an investment basis.  The problem at that time as I already mentioned was also that 
the reality showed something different than what was on the paper. According to plans, 
the economic zone supposed to be prepared and developed. In reality the place for 
economic zone was not prepared at all, the infrastructure was missing. So the effect for 
the state was very small from this. – Logically it failed.   
 
II.C. REFORM ON JULY 1. 2002 
After the fall of communism NK closed and did not really wish to reform or 
change.   But many things happened in 1990ties and these things finally pushed DPRK 
to reform in 2002.  One of the things was a flood in 1995.  The flood was a disaster and 
it was not possible for DPRK to go through it by it self.  This flood resulted in huge 
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food shortages and North Korea found out that nobody actually wanted to help DPRK if 
North Korea did not change and cooperate a bit (Chart 4.)  Other countries offered help. 
But with an offer for large help they asked for system opening and some bigger reforms. 
The other problem was that NK reforms from 1990ties had about zero effect and did not 
help the economy. The state was going in deeper and deeper trouble.  Also when North 
Korea looked at its “big brother” China they saw, that Chinese economy was improving 
and drawing apart from North Korea.  
So because of these several reasons DPRK was forced to accept the reality that 
something has to be done again, otherwise the system could not be maintain. North 
Korea never officially informed about the reasons, which led the country to introduce 
the new reform, but basically, as it has been mentioned according to experts it was a 
result of several factors.     
On July 1st 2002 DPRK introduced the biggest reform ever. It is still only partial 
economic reform, but compare with all reforms done earlier that one is far before them.    
This partial reform consisted of prices and wages changes including change of 
dollar exchange rate followed by changes in social substitution system, changes in 
planning creating policy and others changes.  
 The biggest change and impact had new price of rice. It increased about 500 
times from 0.08 won per kilo to 44 won.  The price was set up bit lower than was black 
market price. Why the main reform was focused on rice? There was shortage of rice – 
which was caused by flood, low productivity, impossibly to import rice and rationing 
system, which was applied, in previous years. This system delivered more rice for 
healthy men and productive people and less for women, elders etc. By this reform this 
system was abolished. Because of shortage, the black market with this commodity was 
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in previous years introduced.  According to North Korean refugees more than 60 % of 
goods, which were bought by the inhabitants, were bought in black market. (One of the 
best-known North Korean refugees in South Korea – Kang Chon – Hwan alleges that 
black market was everywhere and actually whole the country sold and bought there.)  
Black market means market, over which state did not have any control and also 
any advantage. The people simply went to the farmers and were pushed by the shortage 
at official market, to buy rice from farmers directly, with realistic black market price.  
Before the reform the state was buying the rice from farmers for unrealistic low price. 
Every farmer had to sell rice to state. Private selling was abolished.  There was no 
stipulation for the farmers to produce officially more rice if the state did not pay it well.  
The farmers were logically shrinking and did not work effective.  
This outcome was not specific for North Korea only; it is just the economic rule, 
which simply must work! This is just result of demand and supply curve. Of course 
there were many other factors, (such as political factors, terrible flood etc.) but clearly 
from economic point of view the food shortage occurred because the official price of 
food was too low (0.08 WON per kilo) and was not set up at the Equilibrium point 
where Demand curve crossed with the Supply curve (around 44WON per kilo).      
  
What about black market? It worked well. If the people had money (majority 
unfortunately did not), they could buy as much rice as they wanted.  The price, which 
the farmers charged, (around 44WON per kilo) was the price where the total Supply 
curves met the total Demand curve (around 44WON per kilo). Ordinary people needed 
rice and the price, which they were prepared to pay, was reasonable good for the people 
as well as for the farmers. So people tried to sell its product at black market.   The 
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farmers rather than work efficiency for the farms and through the for the state were 
shrinking as much as possible and tried to sell rice under their own managing for the 
realistic prices at black market.  
Because officially it was forbidden to sell any rice at black market, there was a 
certain amount of DWL – business which was not realized, because some people were 
scared of making a business if it was forbidden. These farmers instead of growing corn 
or anything else privately just did not produce anything. 
The state by this price reform of rice in 2002 wanted to meet two goals:  To 
collect more money from the people and secondly – to control again the market with 
rice. North Korea needs every year about 5.5 million tons of rice.  But its production 
was only about 3.5 million tons, which means 2 million tons of shortage. Even with the 
humanitarian aid from abroad, which was about 1 million, ton the Korean consumption 
was not met. The new price system NK assumed may help in improving the production 
on own fields.   It may seem that North Korea was trying to introduce market economy 
at least in rice production but unfortunately this was not true.  The country wanted by 
this step to obtain back the control of the market only and maintain a Socialist Power 
Country doctrine. The country did not really wish reform its system.  
The country wanted to mobilize the money from people simply. By the new 
system only price of rice was increased close to real level. Other prices   were also 
increased but not on the cost level. In general the increase was about 20 times.  
Also wages increased about 18 times.  By this step NK government probably 
wanted to change bit structure of people’s consumption.  The prices of goods or services, 
which were from the socialistic point of view unwanted, were increased the most.  The 
government also wanted by this step to mobilize the people’s money. There was a huge 
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overhang of the money – people had money but did not have a chance to buy anything 
for it – so government wanted to obtain this money from them. The increasing of wages 
was highest for production engineers, skilled technicians and scientists.   
This increasing was also followed by introduction of new merit – base wage 
system. The general ideas were – to abolish the average system of distribution, to 
contract pay system and to introduce a transitional socialist system. Employees should 
be paid according to profit of their company and no according to number of hours spent 
in work. There was very clear said that if the company would not have a profit it would 
result in employee wage cutting.     
There were also changing in social aid system. Especially during 1970ties and 
1980ties the social aid system was very benevolent. By the reform the national subsidy 
was generally canceled and people should try to live on their own income.  Because of 
different wages and canceling the rationing system, the widespread between individuals 
should be greater. 
 Another part of the reform was about changing the exchange rate between USD 
and NK Won.  From artificial official rate 1 USD for 2 NK Won it had been changed to 
151 won selling and 157 won buying. (For illustration now the exchange is rate is about 
1150 per USD, which also means that 1 NK Won is about the same as 1 SK WON). 
More details about it are written later. By this step NK again wanted to mobilize the 
private money, which was over hanged.  
Before the reform, foreigners, who were traveling to North Korea, were not 
allowed to have NK Won – only Donpyo, which was something like vouchers. By this 
NK wanted to protect the dollars black market and wanted to have a control over the 
money, which the foreigners brought. The Donpyo was accepted only in limited shops 
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mostly around the big hotels or monuments where the foreigners were aloud to move.  
But from July 1 the Donpyo was not valid any more.               
 Also reform in state owned enterprises was introduced. Till 2002 very strict state 
planning attitude with detailing planning for each enterprise was practiced.  The State 
Planning Committee made the goals and translated them into long – term development 
plans and quantitative targets for the economy as a whole, as well as for each industrial 
sector and enterprise. But the reformers wanted to introduce something new – the 
planning committee let the enterprises to establish their own plans. The committee 
established only strategic indexes.  No more detailed central plans from Pyongyang.  
Each company should make their own strategy and plan depend on the profitability. The 
management got more powers but also more responsibility. The companies for their first 
time started to work with terms such as “cost and revenue.” The management could bit 
negotiated about the prices what was something really revolutionary. This actually 
means limited opening of the market under state control. This new system also means 
that some very unprofitable and Non-strategic important companies should be closed. 
This also means in some sense unemployment.  
The question is why the state committee stopped with the central planning. Did 
they really want to give more freedom to the enterprises and open the economy? I do 
not think so. More realistic seems different explanation. The plans were during the time 
much more difficult to meet. The reason was not because the planned committee could 
not have good vision about the future, but because very often something very 
unpredictable had happened. To meet the plans did not really depended in 1980ties on 
the people but on other unpredictable factors, which the planners could not influence. 
The Korean economy was depending for example on the imports of steel or production 
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of electricity. So if there were not enough electricity or raw steel, a company simply 
could not work and could not fulfill the plan. It means the plan did not have any 
importance at all. That is probably the reason why the committee rather than shrinking 
in fulfilling the plans stopped with their issuing. I believe that for the leaders of the 
regime and their goal to hold and maintain their power, it was much better to have no 
plans rather than to meet the plans only on paper. If the ordinary people apprehended 
that government lied to them, the trust to its own government and therefore the regime 
declined and it could be dangerous for the leaders.  
  The reform also wanted to establish economic zones. The first plans in mid 
1980ties and its disaster were described earlier. The new plan which is still under 
construction is actually looking much better, but it is necessary to say that important is 
how it will be finally settled down.  At the moment there has been talk about three main 
zones - Shinuiju special administrative district, Keumkangsan district and Gaesung 
district.  The special economic zone should become something like capitalistic islands. 
The private property law should be guarantee, the infrastructure necessary for making 
business should be made, and also administrative preparation should be done.   
 The problem of North Korea is that its neighbor is China, which created already 
some SEZ, and actually quite effectively. So to attract any foreigners means that the NK 
should offer to investor better conditions than the Chinese SEZ. But this is something 
what is very difficult for the NK. For example NK vision about the wages in Gaesung 
district was about 100 USD per months at the beginning. This was not really 
competitive! As far as it cannot be lower than 80 USD, not many companies can be 
attracted by this special economic zone. In this particular case the North Koreans took 
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its request for 100 USD salaries per month back and it was settled that the wage should 
be 50 USD only.  
 The general idea about the SEZ, which has been practicing in China, Kim Jong-
Il and his people do not really want to accept. The model of SEZ in China has supposed 
that around this special zone would be created many new companies, which will support 
the companies in SEZ with raw material, or other untreated material.  Through them the 
prosperity will be made in larger and larger area. So the Chinese actually did not set up 
strict borders of the SEZ but rather wanted to increase the region later when more 
companies started to work for the region.  North Korea does not want that. Their idea 
is to have something like a real island with fence and not really connection with the rest 
of the country. They want to minimize the influence of this zone to rest of the country.  
But if this going to be practiced – it means the effect which we can see in China is not 
possible to expect, because of different conditions. But as there has not been said 
decision done yet, this vision can change.  
 What kind of business should be created in these zones?   As we learned it is the 
best to start with something very simple, which does not really need great skills – so for 
the first stage something likes making textiles or dresses.  During the second stage, 
when some skilled workers may be created, it should be tried something more advanced 
like computer electronic components followed by development of software. From long-
term view there should be made the supply for the foreign trade market of Korean goods. 
  At the moment it seems that The Gaesong economic zone in southern part of the 
country is best prepared. Mostly investors from South Korea want to go there. But the 
situation is bit complicated right now.  The plans and visions actually exist. The money, 
which should be used for financing this program at the time of writing these sentences 
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not. There is no any progress at the moment from South Korean side. The political 
situation in South Korea is bit unstable now (within few weeks there will be general 
election and also the Constitutional Court should announce its decision about 
Presidential impeachment.) The current government wants to invest in NK, but if it 
really happened or when it will happen cannot be said now.  If the election proves 
strong position of URI party the building up of the Gaesong zone will start relatively 
soon.           
 
PART III.  
OVERVIEW OF CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMY 1945 - 2004                                  
 Czechoslovak economy after the Second World War was relatively undamaged. 
Industry was in private hands as well as agriculture and foreign trade. The foreign trade 
was quite crucial for the post war economy. The quality of the goods was comparable 
with goods produced in other industrialized countries such as France or Great Britain. In 
first years after the WW II the Czechoslovakia wanted to participate in Marshal Plan 
and received help mostly from Western countries. But after the democratic election in 
1947 and introducing of Communistic government this was abolished. Stalin forbid to 
take any assistance from West and the partners for us in the future supposed to be 
socialistic countries only.  By 1952 the government  nationalized nearly all sectors of 
economy. Politically reliable communists without any technical skills replaced many 
well skilled managers.   Nobody really opposed that. Central planned economy period 
could start (Chart 7.) 
 Most common for the planned economy after the War were five years plans. The 
first one supposed to start in 1949.  Under the Soviet advice the heavy industry was 
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preferred. The emphasis on heavy industry was strongly repeated from Soviet 
government to our politician especially after the start of Korean War. The country 
became important supplier of machinery and arms to other communistic countries.  The 
trade with socialistic countries was about 70 per cent of total trade (compare to 40 % in 
1948) the price of quite high growth during this period was huge investment and 
inflationary pressure. It resulted in currency conversion in 1953.  After this bit shock for 
next two years only 1-year plans were realized. The second five-year plan (1956 – 
1960) had as a goal again to support heavy industry but also to increase the supply of 
consumer goods. The Economists recognized during that period that only with 
continuing of high investments it was possible to maintain the economy growth.   
 The economy started again to be in trouble in 1958 – industrial production 
staged and situation in agriculture was also not very improving – so voices for reforms 
were about to hear. So some minor partial reform consisted of decentralization of 
authority was made. This decentralization means that the enterprises were free in 
handling investments funds.  But the reform did not bring any success. So in 1962 
everything was put back under the strict central control.  
The target for next five-year plan (1961 – 1965) was putting goal on a foreign 
trade. The socialistic economists had correct feeling that the economy was sick. They 
knew what the medicine should be, but from certain reasons they did not give the 
economy the right treatment in right amount. So it was rather plan than reality to 
increase the foreign trade.  The importance of foreign non-socialistic trade did not 
increase significantly.  
The economy resulted in poor performance and it was still much clearer that the 
Soviet dreams in having small model of Soviet economy in Czechoslovak condition was 
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not possible to realize.  Simply first of all, the country did not have those great national 
resources as USSR. Also the country had quite developed light industry after the war 
compare to USSR, but not heavy industry.  At that time, Czechoslovakia was much 
more oriented toward foreign trade than USSR.  The soviet model wanted to change 
industry structure in Czechoslovakia from lighter industry to heavy industry.  They 
wanted to build new heavy industry factories in Czechoslovakia rather than to put 
intensive investments in present lighter industry enterprises, which would increase 
production and efficiency.  This also resulted that private consumption grew slowly than 
net material product.  There was a shortage of consumer goods and because of that 
people did not have enough opportunities to spend their money, which means that   
consumers were pushed to save their money rather than to invest.  Complementation of 
most investment projects required an inordinate time, freezing funds in unproductive 
uses.  The prices didn’t reflect cost neither scarcity.  And the prices in Czechoslovakia 
were extremely different from world prices. 
At the beginning of 1960ties the economy started to slow down and the 
economists noticed that something wrong was happening and something should be done. 
Even if Czechoslovakia was one of the countries under the command of Soviet Union, 
the political dependency on USSR seemed to be not that big. The government was 
relatively independent and it believed it could reform its economy.  
In middle of 1960ties the government in cooperation with planning committee 
introduced   the biggest reform ever. Also other countries such as Poland or Hungary 
introduced some small partial reforms at that time, but in comparison with them the 
Czechoslovakian reform was much comprehensive.    No single other country from 
socialistic countries under USSR introduced such a big reform as Czechoslovakia did.  
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Unfortunately after few months of running the reform, all the reforms steps were 
stopped in 1968. Even that the first results of economy reform looked quite nicely and 
many economists believed the reform can be successful, the reform finished.  The 
Warsaw pact armies invaded in democratic Czechoslovakia on August 21 in 1968. The 
armies under command of USSR had occupied our country and abolished everything. 
The armies came to Czechoslovakia without any notice, without any agreement from 
Czechoslovak government. Some of the soldiers stayed in Czechoslovakia till in 1990, 
it means more that 22 years. The official reason for this invasion was that the socialism 
in Czechoslovakia was in danger and it was necessary to rescue it and helped the 
republic.  For Czechoslovakia it was a really big shock. Nobody believed that our 
“socialistic friends” would ever come to Czechoslovakia with tanks and weapons. It is 
very important to say that nobody from Czechoslovakia invited the Warsaw troop’s 
armies. It was rather an action under Soviet command. The Soviet were scared they 
were going to loose their influence in Czechoslovakia and that our country might 
change the socialistic system with market economy. Because they did not want to let 
this change happened, the Soviets with other socialistic troops, came to Czechoslovakia. 
The only country from Warsaw pact, which did not join the invasion, was Rumania.   
The Czechoslovakia did not defend against the occupation very much and gave up.  
The tanks brought of course new leaders. Those leaders were prepared to do 
what ever Soviet Union would ask for. The first what the Russians ordered was as I 
already mentioned to stop majority of the economic and social reform steps. New 
leaders grant the order very quickly. 
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After that had happened again very direct central planning, and 100 % state price 
control were applied.  The central planning and the state control were actually much 
more intensive than before the reform.   
But instead of new very strict state control in next few years the economy was 
slightly growing up from 1966 – 1970 the net material growing was 6.9%. But this 
growth was more than 1 % lower than growth in 1967.   Economy continued to grow 
also in next 5 years but the growth was again decreasing and was only 5.7 %. Chemicals 
industry made the fastest growth; the lowest growth had consumer good and fuels.  
Next period (1976 – 1980) was characterized with even less satisfactory. Net 
growth was not only 3.7%. Agriculture and industry did not meet their plan targets.  
Especially the situation in agriculture started to be quite serious during the last period of 
the plan.  Large imports of grain were necessary and the consumers started to complain 
about the shortage of basic food such as meat and milk.   Another plan target – to 
increase the labor productivity was not met also. Czechoslovakia tried to increase the 
export and maintained the balance between export and import on zero level. But 
because of the poor quality of goods certain limitation especially towards west markets 
was the main barrier (Table 7).    
The increasing of oil prices and other raw materials, which Czechoslovakia 
imported, was one of the reasons for slowdown in 1980ties and 1990ties. The other one 
was in huge Czechoslovak energy consumption per capita. The energy consumption 
started to be really a headache. Czechoslovakia had largest energy consumption per 
capita from all socialistic countries. It is true that the increase in GDP during that period 
was possible only because of growing energy consumption and material imports. If we 
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deducted the increasing of energy consumption we would see that the efficiency of the 
economy did not improved at all during that period.    
One of the main goals for the plan 1981 - 1985 was to use more efficiency 
resources. It was not really met. The energy consumption declined by 1.7% only. Very 
much depending on imports of crude oil from Soviet Union, it was very problematic 
situation – special when the Soviet announced that their import to socialistic countries 
would be reduced by 10%. 
Last few years before the communistic regime was overthrow (November 17th, 
1989) can be characterized as period, when our economy was still slowing down. The 
regime recognized it and introduced set of partial reforms, but these reforms were just 
too small. Even after the reforms, number of goods, which were under supply, was 
increasing. To export any goods to Western countries was very uncommon.    
 The regime also started to have a social problem with the people. The 
displeasure of society was increasing and more and more complaining voices could be 
heard.  The underground opposition started to be more and more active and important. 
The number of people who were listening illegally the western radio station “Radio Free 
Europe” was increasing dramatically. More and more people through that radio started 
to understand that everything was not as good as the regime told the people. The illegal 
demonstrations against the regime were more and more often.  
Set of many reasons (mostly the situation in other communistic countries around 
Czechoslovakia) finally over through the regime on Friday, November 17th, 1989. 
Because the change of the regime was very peaceful it has been called “Velvet 
revolution”. The first democratic president Vaclav Havel had been named in December 
1989 and from that time it can be says that democratic system has been applied in 
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Czechoslovakia. Year 1989 also dramatically change the economy situation. Since that 
time the principles of socialist economy were terminated, the principles of market 
economy have been introduced.  
In year 2004 I believe all the main transition already finished. Thousands of 
enterprises have been in private hands and the state holds only few strategically 
important companies.    In year 2002 the GDP per capita was nearly 15.300 USD and 
still increasing. From 1st of May 2004 we have been part of European Union, which 
means a country, where democratic principles and market economy have been applied.                
 
PART IV. 
REFORMS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
 Between the end of Second World War and today several reforms had been 
introduced in Czechoslovakia and later on in the Czech Republic. Because this paper is 
focusing on comparison between North Korea and Czechoslovakia, I would like to look 
mainly on Czechoslovakian reforms, which had similar characteristics with reforms in 
North Korea – specially the reform on July 1st, 2002.  
 Because of that I want to talk firstly about the reform, which was applied 
between 1965 and 1968 in Czechoslovakia. Secondly I want to talk about   the reform, 
which was introduced in 1985 and mainly applied between 1986 and 1989. Finally I 
want to discuss the reform after 1989, where the economy system changed from central 
planned economy to market economy.       
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IV.A. REFORM  1960 - 1968 
 After 1960 the Czechoslovakian economy started to slow down as it has been 
already mentioned. The situation was not really critical at the time, but many 
Economists recognized that the country strategy, which based on central planning, was 
not the best one, and some steps should be done to increase the speed of our economy. 
These economists mainly under the leadership of Mr. Oto Šik openly informed about 
the problems and in cooperation with communistic party started to work on preparation 
of the reform.  
This reform was introduced in 1964. It was called “Šik reform”. It had four main 
goals: 
1. The national plans would show only direction of the economy without 
detailed plans for each enterprise. The planning strategy would reflect 
the actual market situation, demand a supply. 
2. The enterprises would get more freedom and independency, which 
should created conditions, which let them to carry business.  
3. The measurement of a success of any enterprise would be the profit. 
4.  The enterprises and their managements would be responsible for good 
as well as bad economy of the enterprises.  
   
NEW PLANNING STRATEGY 
 The basic framework, on which was the reform build up was changing of 
planning strategy.  Number of local planning committee supposed to be reduced by 
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more than 80%. (These local planning committees were in the past mostly responsible 
for individual plans for local enterprises.)  
 The goal of central planning committee was totally changed. The central 
committee was still directly inferior to Communistic party, but it changed its status from 
a servant to a partner for discussion. According to the reformers the central plans should 
showed only overall long term planning of economic development and provided general 
guidance about the formulation of goals.  
 The central planning committee did not have any power to create plans for 
individual enterprises (except the strategic enterprises.)  Enterprises were free to 
determinate short – term production targets within the framework of the overall goals.  
Plans principal object was to limit significantly the role of the central planning 
authorities while expanding the autonomy and responsibility of the enterprises.  
 The reform introduced new concept to planning strategy - market concept, which 
was based on total market supply and demand curve. It means that even the setting of 
overall goals for the economy by the central planning committee was not depend on the 
wishes of Soviet Union or any other socialistic country, but depended on real world 
demand and supply.  
 The reformers also wanted to divide the economy to several branches, which 
would concentrate and specialize in the industrial production. According to the planners 
visions there should be created large production units – something like cartels, which 
should be linked to the ministries. The head of branch directorates would have the 
overall responsibility for the performance of enterprises. But their power over the 
subordinate should be limited – so it is not another central planned burro. 
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FREEDOM OF THE ENTERPRISES  
   As it has been indicate the enterprises received much more freedom by this 
reform. This freedom means first of all freedom in planning.  Only the management was 
responsible for the planning. They had the power to set up low or high targets. They had 
the power to stop producing certain goods or introduced new products. They still had to 
inform the planning committee about its plans and visions, but it was rather for 
statistical purposes than for approving reasons.  Increasing of the enterprises 
independency had only one reason.  The reason was to create competitive environment 
for the companies. The new main goal of the companies was not to fulfill the plans but 
to carry effectively their own business.   
 By this increasing of independency the government also wanted to stipulate 
export and increase the quality of the goods. The government wanted to increase the 
foreign competition, which they hoped would increase state productivity and lower the 
costs. Because of extremely need of hard currency the export to West World would be 
stipulated through incentives encouraging enterprises to make their products 
competitive on world market. The reformers expected that Czechoslovakian enterprises 
could cooperate with the Western companies on licensing basis, which would bring 
them quickly new technology. With lower labor costs and western technology they 
could relatively easily compete on foreign markets. It also included, that the companies 
could have a part of the hard currency what they earned. (According to Czechoslovak 
law all hard currency earned supposed to be converting through state bank to 
Czechoslovak koruna.)  
The reform wanted to stop the central directives about prices. Newly it depended 
only on the enterprises, what would be the price.  The enterprises would make all their 
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investments through their own resources and interest bearing bank loans. The basic idea 
was that each enterprise should realistically realize how much resource it needed to 
make its business effective - simply no soft budgets.  State subsidy should be 
terminating.  If any enterprise was not a key enterprise for the economy state would not 
help the company by financing the lost.   The state should continue with financing only 
the key economic projects such as power plants or infrastructure investments. 
 
MEASURMENT OF SUCCES – PROFIT 
This goal is very closely connected with the previous one.  The independence for 
the enterprises means also responsibility. And success means profit. The new 
measurement of the enterprise’s success was profit. It of course went along with other 
economic steps, which had to be introduced.  
First of all as has been already mention, the enterprises had a freedom to set up 
its own prices. The prices were supposed to reflect real cost, demand, supply, scarcity, 
necessary investments and the world prices. Enterprises supposed to became financially 
independent realizing the profit from their sales after covering all operating costs and 
taxes.  It was necessary to finish with soft budgeting before realizing this new price 
strategy.  
Also new double independent accounting system had to start to work. Actually 
nobody was able to say if a company is profitable or not before the new system was 
introduced.   
Another step, which had to be introduced, was new wage system. According to 
the new system, the egalitarism should finish. The individual performance rather than 
collective performance should be the major key for the level of any individual wage. 
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The most important for the worker’s salary supposed to be two factors: firstly - his or 
her individual work, secondly the profit of the company.  To insure that the workers 
could influence the management of an enterprise, the workers were supposed to have a 
certain rights to manage the company through the enterprise council. This council had 
an important vote when the management of the company was elected. This new strategy 
also supposed to bring more discipline among the workers and increase their 
performance. Simply the reformers believed that to increase the efficiency and 
production of the employees was possible mostly through their motivation, which was 
one of the biggest problems of socialistic workers. Because in socialistic time “people” 
owned everything and no specific private rights existed, there was such a small pressure 
or motivation for better performance among workers. (Chart 9.)  
 
 RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MANAGEMENT 
 The word responsibility was actually something new in Czechoslovak economy. 
Before the reform, the responsibility of the companies’ management was about zero. It 
is logical, because the enterprises did not have any freedom and were servants of the 
government only and Communistic party. At that stage nobody could seek any 
responsibility from the enterprises. But with all the steps, which I have already talked 
about, it was total different situation.  
 The enterprises could create their own plans, their own prices, and their own 
wages. Also newly, they could influence the number of workers. The managements had 
the right to fire employees, of course with proper notice, if it was necessary.  It did not 
mean to fire only the lazy ones, but also the people for which the company did not have 
enough work.   These rights had to be accompanied with responsibilities and duties 
 44
logically. The duties of the enterprises were to survive. As it has been mentioned the 
soft budgeting was terminated.  If the companies needed new investments and did not 
have enough money, they should ask commercial banks for the loan. State was not 
supposed to help them at all.   
 If the companies were not able to make a profit, the managements would be 
responsible for that. If they were not able to manage the companies, they supposed to 
leave the companies.  If even with new managements the companies were not able to 
make a profit, they would be closed.  Enterprises, which were not crucial for the state, 
and which would not be able to make a profit from long-term view, were supposed to be 
closed very quickly. The new bankruptcy law, which was also introduced, should 
guarantee the speed.  
 On the other hand the profitability of any enterprise should guarantee higher 
wages, and new technology.  The enterprises were allowed to hold part of the hard 
currency, which they earned by exporting to western world, if they invested it in new 
technology. The companies could buy this new technology easily with their hard 
currency.  
 
TESTING OF THE REFORM – REAL EXPERIMENT 
 The previous part of this thesis described the reform, how it was written on the 
paper. The reality was slightly different.  In year 1965 the reformers choused 30 state 
enterprises, where they wanted to apply all the steps as an experiment. According to the 
results of the experiment the government and Communistic party should finally decide 
if Czechoslovakia would apply the revolutionary reform or not and if yes, which steps 
should be changed.  
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 One of the companies where the reform experiment took a place in 1965 was 
“AGROSTROJ JIČÍN”.  This company was a state owned enterprise, which produced 
medium   gardens machinery. Their specialization was mowers. The company had 400 
employees. 75% of its production was placed in Czechoslovak market or in other 
socialistic countries markets in 1960. The remaining 25% was exported to Western 
countries. Before 1965 the production was steadily decreasing because decreasing 
demand from Western countries, which were results of poor quality. In 1965 the export 
to Western countries decreased to 1% only.    The demand from other socialistic 
countries remained about the same level.  
 After one year of experiment the company presented reasonable good results at 
the end of 1965. In comparison with year 1964, the productivity increased by 5.8%. The 
wages increased by 6%. 30 decreased the number of employees. The most important is 
that the company made a license agreement with French – German company “Gutbrod”.   
The Czechoslovak company received the license, which allowed it to make new 
mountain mower MF 70. With new western technology and cheap skilled labor work, 
the company created very high quality product for reasonable price.  Part of the license 
agreement was that French and Germans partners helped the new product at Western 
markets, which they were not really interested in. On the other hands Gutborg Company 
hoped that through cooperation with Czechoslovakia, they could obtain some Eastern 
markets.  After the 1965, the company had quite positive hard currency surplus, which it 
invested in new technology. Next year they exported to Western states 15% of its 
production and according to their vision, the number should double in 1967.  Not only 
the result of Agrostoj Jicin, but also results of other enterprises, which were part of the 
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experiment, pursued the government the reform was the correct one and should be 
applied through the whole country (Table 6.)        
 
 THE REFORM IN REAL PRACTICE 
Twelfth Party Congress gave its official approval to the new program in 1965 – 
it was called New Economic Model. One year later in 1966 the government agreed with 
the final version of the reform and the experiment could start.  The first part of the 
reform started in 1967, right after XIII. Communistic party Congress gave the final 
approval for the reform. The second part, which needed more preparation such as new 
bankruptcy law started on 1st January 1968.  This final approving by the thirteenth 
Communistic Congress had also social aspect.  People understood the party wanted to 
deliver more freedom and independency among enterprises. The liked the idea and at 
the same time they got the feeling that also more individual freedom and democracy 
should be applied for the Czechoslovak nation.  Because people in the enterprises had 
some freedom they wanted also had similar freedom in civil life.  If in the enterprise the 
workers through its committee voted the general manager of the company, they also 
wanted to have real democratic elections, they wanted to have the right to travel and get 
some experiences in individual life, the people wanted to enjoy the democracy. 
The typical example can be my seen in my father, who finished the University in 
1968. He felt that there was much big freedom in the society at that time and he wanted 
to go abroad for few months to receive some working experiences. Till 1965 it was 
possible to receive the working experiences only in other socialistic countries such as 
Russia, Rumania etc. Actually nobody complained about it because everybody knew 
complaining was not really allowed and would not change anything.  In 1968 my father 
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went at the office where these working experiences were organized. They offered him 
as usually firstly working experiences in Poland.  He refused, complained and asked for 
working experiences in Great Britain. He believed at that special time he had the right to 
complain and to go to other country than Poland or Russia.  Finally he was accepted and 
sent to London for three months. He personally felt the reform brought also 
democratization.   
The reform   did not want to abolish socialism either did not want to create free 
enterprises market system. It wanted through less direct central control to improve the 
management under the supervising of Communistic party. This reform was called „ 
Reform of socialism with human face.”  As many economists said the country wanted to 
apply the Scandinavian model where state guarantee high social level but at the same 
time the enterprises are quite free to carry business.  The economists say that if the 
reform would work in practice Czechoslovakia would be in 1990 around the same level 
such as Denmark or Sweden those days. In reality the Czechoslovak GDP level in 1990 
was less than 50% of Swedish GDP.    
As it has been mention in overview about Czechoslovak economy the reform 
was terminated in September 1968 when Armies from other socialistic countries 
invaded Czechoslovakia and all reforms steps abolished.  Oto Šik, who was the father of 
the reform, emigrated to Basiley in Switzerland, where he became expert in Swiss 
economy institute.   
 
IV.B. REFORMS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA  1980 - 1987. 
 After the changes in 1968 the very strict state control over the economy was 
applied. The economy was in long term loosing its speed. The poor performance in 
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1980 persuaded party leaders to think about some changes, which would treat the 
economy. Therefore the government introduced a partial reform, which described in 
document called the „Set of Measure to Improve the System of Planned National 
Economic Management after 1980. “ The document was approved by the government as 
well as by the Communistic party without any grand complains. The partial reform was 
nothing really new. Comparing with the planned reforms from 1965 this reform from 
1980 was much more conservative. Some of the Economists experts were not happy 
about the measure of the reform. They predicted the steps of the reform were not big 
enough and therefore would not improve the economic situation significantly. The 
history proved they were right.  
The reform had two main goals: 
1. To increase the competitiveness and quality of Czechoslovakian products. 
2.  To decrease the energy consumption. 
 
QUALITY OF PRODUCTS 
 The poor quality of Czechoslovakian products was not anything new. The 
country had that problem for many years and the Economists understood that the 
qualities of the products were in some way related to the situation in the enterprises. In 
1980 the average age of industrial machinery and equipment was 13 years. 10% of the 
machinery was more than 25 years old.  The newest Western technology was not 
available at all.  The people did not have any motivation to work hard. The wage system 
did not really reflect any differences among workers. The wage system made 
differences between industries, but not between individuals. The system mostly 
preferred manually workers, rather than scientists or intelligences.  
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Because of these problems the reformers actually permitted somewhat greater 
freedom of action for managers of enterprises in selected operational areas, giving them 
more authority over their own investments and providing financial incentives to workers. 
Before the reform, the managers did not have any significant influence over the plan 
production. The central planning committee was in charge of that.  This reform bit 
liberalized the situation. The managers had newly the power to discuss the production 
with central planning committee and according to the law they had the right to refuse 
the plan from very serious reason and apply to higher authorities. But on the other hand 
that refusing would have in real situation very serious impact on the manager’s position. 
The real world actually showed that only two enterprises refused their plans in first year 
of the reform.  
Also newly the enterprises were more independent in financing of new 
technology. Before the reform, all the investments were coming from outside. The 
enterprises could not have to use their own money, which they earned, but had to wait 
for outside ministerial decision and outside money. But the reform did not bring 
absolute freedom.  They could not use all the resources, but only small part of them. (In 
most cases the enterprises were allowed to use only 40% of their own earnings.) 
Another problem was that even for financing from their own resources they needed the 
approval from ministry about the using of the funds. This approval was not automatic.     
The reforms also introduced the wage differentiation. The workers were 
stimulated through much higher pay which reflected how well they worked as well as 
how profitable were the enterprises. Also some individual distinction rather than 
collective rewards were introduced. These higher salaries had certain conditions, which 
limited their applications.  These higher pays were concentrating only over the 100 per 
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cent production. If the companies did not meet the plans, there were no any financial 
sanctions.  
The reformers wanted through better managerial ability also increase the foreign 
trade. The vision was actually quite ambitious. It supposed that this reform could 
increase the foreign trade faster than national income.  
What was written above means that the government understood where the 
problem was but at the same time they understood that more freedom for enterprises 
would mean lost of their control over the economy. Because they did not really want 
that, the reform had very restraining limitation. Situation after first year of the reform 
showed that production increased by 0.5%, while the wages increased by 1.2%.   Most 
of the prices were still under the state command and did not reflect the real cost.  The 
prices increased in first year by 2% only. 
 
 
DECREASING OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
As it has been already mention one of the biggest problems of Czechoslovak 
economy was highest energy consumption per capita. The increasing speed of the 
economy in previous years was possible to achieve mainly through increasing of energy 
consumption rather than increasing efficiency. The increasing through energy 
consumption had of course certain limits.  Czechoslovakia produced the energy mainly 
from three resources: coal, which was available in Czechoslovakia and crude oil and 
natural gas, which were imported from Soviet Union.  In 1980 the production of coal in 
Czechoslovakia was on maximum level and there was not really a big space for 
increasing that. (Czechoslovakia was self-sufficient in coal production and did not 
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import almost any from abroad.)  The amount of crude oil and gas from Soviet Union 
could not be also increased because of limits in Soviet production.    
The situation got worse in middle of 1980, when Soviet Union announced that 
they wanted to cut the export to socialistic countries by 10%. By the reform the 
Communists wanted to improve the bad situation.   The government saw that some of 
the heavy industry enterprises were inefficient and consumed inadequate amount of 
energy.  The government wanted to reduce these productions which were unbelievable 
expensive and ordered us by Soviet Union in previous years and shifted the production 
back to light industry. The government wanted mainly to shift the structure of the 
economy from productive side, which required huge energy to more advanced 
technologies and capital-intensive industry.(Chart 8)  
The government wanted to focus on specialization rather than on self-sufficiency 
in all sectors. Because of that special attention was given to machine building, 
electronic and chemical industry where the Czechoslovak government believed could 
compete with Western world. But in reality the enterprises were not independent as 
much as they needed to compete with foreigner companies. Even after the reform the 
working standards were still lower than in West Europe. The Economists argued that 
this was because of inadequate specialization; insufficient use of foreign licenses, and 
cumbersome restraints on research projects.   After first year of the five-year plan the 
government recognized the reform was not enough and that it should be more radical. 
In 1984 the government accepted the poor results of the reform and tried to 
rewrite the reform. They understood that much wider reform should be set up. They 
looked in the history and inspirited by the Czechoslovak experiment in 1965, especially 
by the planning strategy.    
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It was decided that for the year 1987 one hundred and twenty largest enterprises 
would receive only key planning figures from the central authorities. These firms were 
supposed to find profitable forms for their activities and managing their own finance. It 
was about 100 % more than what was seeking by “The Set of Measures“– which 
planned to remain the state control over the firms in 1980.  
In comparison with experiment in 1965 the new reform was not as radical as the 
reform in 1965. For example the 1965 experiment supposed to finish with state control 
over the prices. In the latest reform the state still wanted to control them, but set up 
them at more realistic level. In other words the state still wanted to maintain the control 
over the economy.  The enterprises from experiment showed not as bad results as the 
enterprises, which were not included in experiment.  But still the reality was far behind 
the expectation. The growth rate among the enterprises in experiment increased by 1.8%, 
while the rest of the economy showed only 1.1% increasing. (Chart 9.)   
The social explanations of relatively poor results were in society awareness of 
anything new. The people had experiences with the end of radical reform from 1968 and 
were not that enthusiastic for new similar reform.      
 Some analysis said that this reform from 1987 would not be possible in 1970 or 
1980, where very strict state control under Soviet command were applied. The latest 
reform from 1987 was possible to create only because of approval of M. Gorbachev, the 
Soviet president.   
The Communist reforms between 1980 and 1987 helped bit the Czechoslovak 
economy. The changing in economic planning was really revolutionary thing. But the 
real activation of economy did not come. The reforms were still too small.  So after 2 
years, in November 1989 people just decided there was enough of socialism and system 
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changing was necessary. There were huge demonstrations every day for 2 weeks since 
November 17th 1989.  The regime collapsed very quickly    and the real comprehensive 
reform could come. 
 
IV.C. CZECHOSLOVAK / CZECH REFORM 1989 -TODAY           
Czechoslovak transformation from planned economy to market economy was 
based on few basic stones – price liberalization, liberalization of foreign trade, market 
liberalization, privatization, macroeconomic stabilization and institutional building. 
After the fall of socialism, Czechoslovakia was one of the countries with very good 
initial conditions. The modernization was on quite high level and the distortion was 
relatively small. The transition in Czechoslovakia was in general very similar to 
transition in other advanced socialistic countries such as in Poland, Slovenia or Hungary.  
But few differences and dissimilarities between the reforms in Czechoslovakia and 
other countries of course occurred.   
 
Macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization, privatization 
The Government in Czechoslovakia took as a first step of the reform 
macroeconomic stabilization. This stabilization consisted of very restrictive control over 
the whole economy. As next steps were applied price liberalization, foreign trade 
liberalization and deregulation.  The main reason for choosing macroeconomic 
stabilization before liberalization was to protect country from hyperinflation, which 
according to many studies supposed to occur if the steps were reversed. The 
macroeconomic stabilization was simply one of the main goals of the government.  
There were not so much conflicts between economists about the first step – 
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macroeconomic stabilization – generally everybody agreed that this was necessary and 
had to be done first.  
But there was no clear answer among the economists how should be done the 
second step – price liberalization. The first group around the ministry of finance V. 
Klaus suggested comprehensive price liberalization in connection with very strict fiscal 
and monetary restructure and devaluation. The opposition around Social democratic 
party argued that the economy couldn’t survive that huge shock liberalization and 
recommended some partial step-by-step liberalization. Finally the first way was taken.   
 Next step, which was followed, was privatization. Here I would like to focus 
only on large-scale privatization. The Czechoslovak government actually also the Czech 
government knew how important was privatization. The state enterprises with 
inefficient managers just simply could not continue. They Government wanted to start 
the privatization as soon as possible because by every day under the state command the 
enterprises were loosing their value. 
I should remind that during the socialistic period most of the state enterprises 
had soft budgets, and whenever they were in trouble, the government always helped 
them. Because of low quality of goods and high cost of the production the enterprises 
were in trouble permanently. So it was really huge liability for the state to maintain all 
the state enterprises. The government wanted to terminate its liability as soon as 
possible, because the money was needed in other places. That was the main reason why 
the state choused the shock therapy rather than step-by-step privatization.   If they 
choused step-by-step privatization most of the manager enterprises would focus on how 
to delay its privatization and how to survive at their positions rather than how to 
increase the companies values.     
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New owners of state enterprises 
The politicians had to answer the question whom to sell the enterprises -to the 
current managers?  The leaders did not want to take Hungarian way of privatization 
when they sold the enterprises to enterprise management with communistic history. It 
seemed that it could not be acceptable by the ordinary people in Czechoslovakia. What 
about foreign investors? The foreign investors did not really want to participate in initial 
stage of transition. The unstable economic environment, huge investments which were 
necessary, no trading connection to west world and lack of information made from 
Czechoslovakia bit unfriendly environment for foreign investors.  The foreigners 
needed more time and information to think about investments. But time was something 
what the Czechs did not want to give. The speed was more important. What about 
Czechoslovak people? To sell the enterprises to domestic people was also not possible 
because private capital that could invest the restructuring did not exist. The average age 
of machineries was about 15 years at that time, there was no high technology and huge 
investments were expected from new owners. But in the Czechoslovakia, there were no 
reach people who could buy the enterprises and invest massively.   
 
Mass privatization 
The Czechs tried to find another way – the mass privatization. The basic 
principle of mass privatization was very simple - to deliver the state enterprises to state 
inhabitants. The main purpose for this way of privatization was not to find the greatest 
owners, to bring the capital or new program. The goal was to separate as soon as 
possible the enterprises from the state budget and state control.   Also it was very 
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important political decision. The people lived for 40 years in socialism without private 
property.  The state owned everything and the people owned everything collectively.  
The privatization and actually first private owning of enterprise was something 
like first positive result of transition changes.  After the privatization started, the people 
could see that there were not only increasing prices in capitalism but also some benefits. 
The privatization was supposed to stimulate the people for their creation of own 
business. 
 My personal opinion is that this massive privatization actually helped the 
government in its shock therapy. The people were more tolerating the problems around 
transition than they would if there was no privatization.  The people could really believe 
that the transition and real prices according to cost would have later some positive effect 
in their life.  From that point of view I believe the way of privatization was very good – 
actually better than to sell the companies to MBO or EBO or to find strategic partner in 
long term process.   
In socialistic time the people were not push to think. There was planned 
economy and everybody did what the plan said. Nobody really thought how to work. 
But after privatization the people had something in their hands. They could see if the 
companies went up or down. They could see the reasons why and they could understand 
that the prices had to increase. So I believe the mass privatization helped so much 
specially in people attitude towards reforms and changes.  
 As a method of mass privatization, Czechoslovakia choused voucher method. 
The voucher cost 1.000 Czechoslovak crowns, which was about 15% of average Income. 
The property, which the people had received for the voucher, was about 12.000 crowns 
on average, which was about 12 times higher than initial investments, which were 
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needed. Because of relatively small people’s costs, the disappointing if certain company 
was closed down because of non-profitability was not too bad. People took the 
privatization more as a lottery game where they could win quite much but loose about 
nothing. There is another positive effect of this privatization. The unprofitable 
companies were shut down very soon with minimum cost.  Privatization was of course 
not the only way of creating new private firms. Creating new firms or joint ventures 
also started to be very popular. From domestic money could be created mostly only 
small private companies – which was happened in huge measure, but the resources were 
not big enough to create huge private imperia. The foreigners actually waited and 
closely watched the situation in Czechoslovakia. They wanted to invest only in safe 
region. The foreigners came – but it took some times. 
 The first period of transformation, when the first market liberalization steps 
were introduced, was attended by huge decline in economy.  This decline was occur in 
all transformation countries and I would say it was necessary tax for the transformation 
and there was no way how to make a transformation without decline. As Economists 
said: There is no free lunch!  The decline had to come. It is important to notice that 
during this period our economy lost 1/3 of our industry, 1/4 of our agriculture, and 1/5 
of our GDP. 
 
SIDE EFFECTS OF THE REFORM 
As the Czech government put so much emphasis on the first three steps of 
transition, it is good to remind that the institutional building did not really meet the 
expectation. Actually the real effect and lack of well providing institutional buildings 
were discovering bit later. Mostly after the first transition steps were finished.  If the 
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institutional building and legal environment would be better prepared, probably more 
foreign investors would come in the first stage of privatization. As some Economists 
says it’s probably true that some of enterprises, which were should down, could survive. 
But according what I have written I believe the effect would not be as positive as it was 
with fast privatization.     
The transition period can be also characterized as the huge larceny of state 
property and business – theft. As the government very concentrated on the privatization 
and the speed, the legislative, the tax reform and all the law, which were necessary for 
well functioning private sector, were not well maintained.  There was actually no law 
that reflected well the private property system; there was no a law, which provided 
complete tax system. The excuse, which the politicians say now, is that the state could 
not just manage everything in one time. So many properties were stolen. It was side 
effect, which had to occur when the speed was taken as priority number one.   
Especially during the privatization the most important factor was speed, no strict 
control over the property. It resulted that many really valuable property from the SOE 
disappeared, also that new shadow economy started to be so massive. The state politics 
were thinking that lower policy was better than strict policy. If there were strict policy it 
means for example that instead of one big no perfect privatization per day, there would 
be only one large privatization per week. But that privatization would be almost perfect.    
In our case, we wanted perfect privatization, but more than perfect privatization, 
we wanted fast privatization. Generally I agree with this allegation. But in Czech case 
the regulating policies were too low.   
Evidences of that can be seen in banking system. The banking system was put in 
trouble very soon after liberalization because there were no strict regulations for 
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creating new banks. So during the transition period 28 new banks were created mostly 
from domestic resources. It was not real picture of Czech economy, because the 
economy did not have enough money to create that many banks. There were not even 
enough human resources for these banks. Banking managements and controls over the 
banks were very week and state did not manage it really well. The banking bankruptcy 
had to start. The state felt some responsibility because it missed the control over the 
banks, so it compensated all the clients who lost their money in banks.   So the cost of 
this lack of institutional building in banking sector finally was about 500 billions Czech 
crowns. (About 16 billion USD) 
 
PART V. 
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND DPRK 
 As I already mentioned at the beginning of this paper, I believe there are many 
similarities between DPRK and Czechoslovakia.  This can be also seen from the 
overview of both economies as well as from the described reforms, which the countries 
introduced in the past. Now I would like to concentrate on some of the similarities and 
try to find out if similar steps, which took both countries, resulted in similar outcomes 
or why not.  I want to pick up only few similarities, which I believe are important, and 
which are quite obvious. Do these similarities allow me to predict what would be effect 
of the latest North Korean reform? If yes, what is the prediction? That is the goal of this 
third part.     
 
SYSTEM 
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The first similarity we find is the similarity in situation, which occurred after the 
war. Both of the countries had private sectors and both of the countries were tried to 
nationalize their industries.  In both countries it was quite successful and the state, after 
nationalization was finished, owned and governed agriculture and industrial sector.   
The state ownership was in both countries introduced very quickly after the war. 
The countries did not have any experiences about this system and the system changes 
were quite radical. It was not a big problem for both countries to adopt total new 
unknown system. When market economy was introduced in Czechoslovakia, the people 
again quite quickly adopted the changes and have taken advantages of new system.  If 
market economy will be introduced in North Korea, I expect similar positive reaction 
from the people. There are no historical roots in DPRK, which would block or make 
difficult these changes. 
 
DEPENDENCY ON SOVIET UNION   
 
One of the main reasons why both countries grew after the world was the 
assistance of Soviet Union.  I believe both countries at this point made a mistake in 
orientation only toward USSR. And it is important to say that same mistakes made 
similar results. It is also necessary to say that there was no really alternative solution, so 
neither CSSR nor DPRK could really change it.  The orientation to one big country and 
its support simply mean that the lives in both countries (CSSR – USSR or NK-USSR) 
were very connected. It means that the Czechoslovakia or North Korea had to do what 
the superior - USSR said. 
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 In Czechoslovak case – the very bad result of this strong orientation toward 
USSR could be seen in energy case. In middle of 1980 the Soviet announced they 
wanted to cut the export of crude oil to Czechoslovakia by 10 per cent. This cut 
supposed to have significant effect on the Czechoslovak economy. Czechoslovakia 
could not do anything else than to accept it and to prepare to slow down the economy. 
North Korea had much worse experiences with Soviet crude oil. After the 
collapse of Soviet Union the import of crude oil was from one to another year down by 
90 per cent.  Not only the oil but also other crucial goods and material from USSR were 
cut down very dramatically.   These cuts resulted in collapse of economy and crises.   
This similarity does not really allow me to make any prediction about the effect 
of the latest North Korean reform, but I just wanted to show by this example how 
similar problems were happening in CSSR and DPRK and how similar outcomes these 
problems made.   
 
PLANNING 
Similar planning was another category where we can compare these two 
countries very closely. The countries had the same system – state planning committee, 
which made a detailed plans for sectors and in cooperation with regional committees 
they made the detailed plans for enterprises. The enterprises did not have any freedom, 
could not influence anything. Both countries found out that it did not work well. In both 
countries it was one of the main reasons for slowing down of the economy. The 
Czechoslovak found out for first time in 1960 and again in 1980. North Korea has found 
out it in 2002.  
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Generally the central planning was wrong because it did not reflect real demand 
and supply, the cost of production etc. Czechoslovakia could not change these rules. 
And upon Czechoslovak experiences even DPRK can not be successful with planning 
economy.    And as many microeconomics theory proved there is no better way for 
efficiency that the free price market system.   
 
HEAVY INDUSTRY 
Both countries tried to have as a main goal heavy industry after the war. In both 
countries the high growth rate in 50ties and 60ties was because the growth was oriented 
on production and no on consumption.  Both economies also depreciated the agriculture 
and were thinking that the heavy industry was the only possible way.  The problem was 
that the growth of this part of economy was in both countries made mostly through 
investments – no through the consumer demand and competitive market.  If investments 
were the reason for this quite rapid artificial growth in heavy industry, the country 
should not ignore investments in other parts of the economy.  To invest only in heavy 
industry and to invest minimum to agriculture or light industry was in both planned 
economy very bad decision 
Both countries made a mistake in that. When the latest radical reform in 
Czechoslovakia was applied in 1989 one of the biggest problems of the economy was in 
heavy industry. More than 50% of all heavy industry enterprises stopped at least 
temporary. The industry was not modern at all and compare with foreigners western 
companies, the production was unacceptable costly. Most of the companies could not 
survive.  
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Because of similarity on this field and because the radical North Korean reform 
from 2002, the country can expect huge problems and many closed down.  The situation 
can be very similar to the situation in Czechoslovakia after 1989.     
 
COUNTRY IMPORTANCE 
 Last similarity, which I would like to talk, is geographical similarity and 
importance of the countries for the region. If somebody is describing Czechoslovakia, 
he or she is usually describing it as very important country, which is in heart of the 
Europe.  During the Communism, Soviet Union always cared about Czechoslovakia 
more than about other socialistic countries. The Czechoslovak had a direct border with 
Western Germany and Austria; it was except East Germany the West most country, 
strategically very important.  Also compare to other socialistic countries, 
Czechoslovakia had usually better outcomes. The people there never fully accepted the 
socialistic regime, the underground opposition was very powerful and because of that 
the Soviet Union had to take special attention toward Czechoslovakia. The invasion in 
1968 showed how important for the USSR Czechoslovakia was and how much power 
the Soviets used to hold that strategic country under their command. During the Cold 
war, Soviet Union had there the most crucial missiles and weapon systems in 
Czechoslovakia.  
When the regime terminated the Western countries cared about Czechoslovakia 
more than about the others. (Again except West Germany for East Germany). The 
politicians believed the Czechoslovakia was something like the gate between West 
Europe and East Europe and it was very important who influenced it.  
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North Korea was as well as Czechoslovakia very important. Fief between USA 
and USSR about influence on that country everybody knows.  The country has as well 
as Czechoslovakia very strategic location and West countries as well as East countries 
want to take a control over it. The importance of the country increased after Kim Jong-Il 
announced he has had nuclear weapons. I want to talk about this problem more detail 
later, but the message what I want to show now, is that because of that neither China, 
nor USA nor Russia can turn aside the country and must to take special attention to 
DPRK. The country is very important for stability in the region, even if the economic 
power of DPRK is very limited.  
This similarity shows that both countries have been very important for the 
countries, which lead the World.  The World leaders take special attention to these 
countries, and through offering help and other things try to influence happening inside 
the countries. On one hand it was positive for Czechoslovakia as well as for North 
Korea, because the countries could receive special helps and treatments. On the other 
hand the countries became part of a game about who would win the influence over them 
and have had only limited power to do anything about it. 
 
PART VI. 
COMPARISON OF THE REFORMS 
 According to what has been written the countries are quite similar in many 
aspects.  As I already mentioned I just picked up only few similarities, which I believe, 
are relatively crucial.  These similarities in crucial conditions as well as in results of 
similar steps which both countries took allow me to look on the reforms which have 
been described in this paper and try to compare them.   
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I can compare them, because the reforms, which were introduced in both 
countries, were very similar. The reforms in both countries were about changing 
planning strategy, independence of enterprises, opening the market, state control etc. If 
the countries are really similar as I am alleging, the results of the reforms should be 
relatively comparable (of course with certain differences).  
 
 
RANKING OF THE REFORMS 
My thesis mainly focuses on four reforms: 
1. North Korean reform in 2002 
2. Czechoslovakian reform  (experiment) between 1965 and 1968 
3. Czechoslovakian reforms between 1980 and 1987 
4. Czechoslovakian reform in 1989 
If I should rank the reforms according to their economic integrity, outcomes and 
economic importance, I believe the biggest effect had the Czechoslovakian reform from 
1989. That one was the most comprehensive. Second one was Czechoslovakian reform, 
which happened between 1965 and 1968, third one was North Korean reform from 2002 
and the reform with the smallest influence over the economy was Czechoslovakian 
reform from 1980 – 1987.  
 
NEW PLANNING SYSTEM 
In Czechoslovakia as well as in DPRK the new planning system was one of the 
most crucial elements of each reform. But is it important to say that introduction of new 
planning system only, without changes in wages, prices and investment policies cannot 
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really change much. The planning strategies for all three reforms were not significantly 
different. They all had the same goal – to open the economy, to give more freedom to 
enterprises.  The differences can be seen firstly in the level of opening, and secondly in 
the other steps, which were vitally connected with the opening economy. I mean by this 
mostly the changing of wage system, price system, investment system etc.      
The new planning strategy, which introduced DPRK in 2002, is relatively open. 
The central planning committee set up only the goals, which translated into long-term 
plans. The enterprises should set up their own plans. This change was also followed by 
new independent accounting system, more freedom for the managers, new wage system 
for the workers, new price system and others steps.  The state transferred some of its 
power, but not as much as it could.  It seems that the state gave up some of its power, 
but on the other hand still holds quite crucial control over the economy. It seems that the 
goal for the state is not to transfer its economy to market economy, but to improve its 
economic situation only with remaining of control over it.   
If we look for comparison in Czechoslovakia, we can find out changing of 
planning strategy in all three reforms between 1965 and 1985.  In 1980 the planning 
committee set up also only key targets for selected enterprises. But vital changing of 
wage system, changing of investment system or changing of prices did not follow the 
changing of planning strategy. The effect of this reform for the economy was nearly 
zero. The goal of the state was to try to improve the economic situation with all the 
respect to current power.  The state was not prepared to give up anything.  
  On the other hand, the experiment form 1965 included all these factors. The 
managers received relatively high independency, very high responsibility. The workers 
got better money for better work and also through their committee had a right to 
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influence the managerial staff.  The enterprises were also allowed to keep some the hard 
currency, which they obtained from foreign business. The effect for the enterprises, 
which were in the experiment, was relatively big. The goal of this reform was I believe 
bit higher than goal of DPRK reform in 2002. The Czechoslovak state delivered its 
power because it found out, that the state is not the best owner. The state wanted to 
improve the general situation. It was prepared to loose its power if it helps the economy.  
Because North Korean changing of planning strategy was somewhere between 
these two Czechoslovakian reforms, if we isolate all others factors we can expect the 
result should be also somewhere between. From Czechoslovak experiences, I can say 
the changing of planning strategy how DPRK introduced, would have definitely 
positive effect at least from short or medium point of view. But this statement is in 
power only if we isolate this reform steps from other factors such as resolving nuclear 
issue, Chinese economic growth, weather conditions etc.                  
 
NEW PRICE SYSTEM  
 In its reform in 2002 North Korea introduced also new wage and new price 
system. Especially the price system was changed really significantly. Before the reform, 
prices were very strictly controlled by the state and the gap between official prices and 
unofficial black market prices was huge. In case of rice the increase was about 500 
times. Also the gap between official and unofficial prices of other goods was 
unbelievable big. 
 Significant rapid change like that can be very dangerous for the stability of the 
government. If the prices are too high, people can over throw the leaders.  Instead of 
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that danger, DPRK took this tactic before the annually prices changing. I can see two 
reasons for that.  
First – The official market in DPRK did not work at all. Most of the goods were 
trade unofficially. Only minority of the goods could be bought for official prices. So the 
rapid changes applied only to these minority goods.  These changes actually did not 
increase the prices, which paid the costumers that significantly as it may seems. These 
new prices actually brought the goods back from unofficial market to official market 
only. That was I believe one of the main goal of the price changing. 
Second - The state would not introduce something, what will terminate its 
existence. I believe DPRK government thought before the reform very deeply and found 
out the government’s high possibility of surviving even with new price system.   
The new prices actually did not reflect 100% the real prices, but at least 
decreased the gap between real prices and official prices, which was a positive sign. NK 
did not give up the prices setting to market.  The government was still fully responsible 
for that, but with certain respects to enterprises managements. Here it can be says again 
the same thing as before about new planning strategy. The government recognized the 
problem, tried to solve it, but at the same time the government wanted to have a control 
over the prices and economy.  
Czechoslovakia did not introduced price changes, which could be compared to 
huge changes in North Korea in 2002.  Czechoslovakia was using different strategy. 
Central authorities set prices on over 1.5 million kinds of goods.  The state was 
increasing the prices annually. Before the reform in 1965, state enterprises were 
theoretically autonomous financial entities that covered costs and profits from sales. 
Because the government set production quotas, wage rates, and prices for the products 
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manufactured and the inputs used in the process, however, managers had little freedom 
to manage.  By the reform in 1965, many quotas were banned; enterprises obtained 
more control over the prices. Because annually price changes, the gap between official 
and real prices was not as big as in NK. During the reform in 1965 the prices went up 
slightly, but not significantly.  The managers had more freedom about the prices, but 
still the final words said the government. The managers had a power to negotiate.   
Reform in 1985 did not bring big changes in price strategy. The reformers 
wanted the enterprises to be financially independents, but the prices were in charge of 
government as well as the wages. The managers in 1985 did not have real negotiating 
power.  
 The biggest increasing of prices brought the reform from 1989. In this reform 
we can see the measure of the gap between state prices and market prices. Most of the 
prices increased to market level. The state gave up most of its power over the prices, but 
not all. It kept the control over the strategic prices such as food or housing. On average 
the prices increased by 3 times, during two years.  Between 1989 and 1991 the price of 
milk increased from 2 Kcs to 12 Kcs, which is about 6 times.  Average price of 
Czechoslovakia made “Skoda” car increased from 50.000 Kcs to 150.000 Kcs. The 
price of 1 liter gasoline increased from 8 Kcs to 18 Kcs.   
 The reforms in North Korea as well as in Czechoslovakia followed generally the 
same goal in price changes.  The goal of the price changes was to put the prices to more 
realist level, to decrease the gap, between real cost and prices. This was of course 
positive. In both countries during all reforms (even in the Czechoslovakian reform in 
1989, where state also guaranteed prices of certain products) the state did not give up 
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the control over the prices totally, but only partially.  The prices were just too important. 
From political point of view uncontrolled prices were too dangerous for the government. 
         The creators of different 
reforms in both countries had the same goal, but they selected different strategies, which 
brought different outcomes.   From the available results, we can see that more giving up 
and independency means better outcomes.  But it is important to notice that nobody was 
expecting that governments would give up all control over the prices. Even in 
developed economies such as France or UK the governments control some prices and to 
criticize DPRK and Czechoslovakian reformers for not giving up the control over all the 
prices would not be correct.         
  I believe in North Korean case, the reformers could be more opened but 
we should not forgot that the main goal of this reform was not to introduced market 
economy, but just do only steps, which were necessary to improve the economic 
situation without loosing control over it.      
 
NEW WAGE SYSTEM 
New wage system, which was introduced as a part of the reform also, brought 
significant changes to North Korean economy. The main goal of this step was to 
increase the productivity and quality of the goods. The changes in wages were very 
much connected to new planning strategy and price system. New North Korean wage 
system as well as planning strategy and price system had certain limits, which decreased 
its potential effect.                                 
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The problem was that the wages were even after reform still under governmental 
control in general. The enterprises received some power in their creation, but still had to 
stay within limits, which the government set up. The other important thing, which 
should be notice here, is that by this radical reform government changed its attitude 
toward workers.  The government was more interested in individual worker’s 
performances than in collective workers performances and the new system fully 
reflected it. This can be seen as a very positive sign.   
 Reforms in Czechoslovakia also consisted of new wages system.  The goal was 
very similar to North Korean one. The government wanted to increase productivity and 
to improve individual workers morality. This statement is valid for all three 
Czechoslovakian reforms. But of course all three reforms showed different outcomes. 
The governments in Czechoslovakia as well as the government in North Korea did not 
give the control over the wages totally, but only partially. The wages in Czechoslovakia 
even after reforms were under relatively strict government control. One of the reasons 
was that the government was scared of inflation.  
 The reform in 1965 allowed the managers to differentiate among the workers 
according to their individual outcomes. The enterprises could negotiate about the wages 
generally with the government, who had the final word. The increasing was in many 
companies guaranteed whenever the productivity went up. Instead of control by the 
government the managers still had some relatively high influences about wages in their 
enterprises and we can call them relatively independent. In this reform the trade unions 
increased their power. Newly they were the partners for the managements and 
government during the wages negotiations.  
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 Also in 1989 reform the government did not give up fully its control over the 
wages.  As well as prices, the wages were for the government very crucial. But it can be 
seen slightly different strategy than in 1965 reform. At this time, the government tried 
to set up clear criteria, which would guarantee wages increasing in state enterprises. 
Whenever the productivity increased, the amount of money, which were extra earned by 
a company (certain percentage), were guaranteed to employees. There was also a 
general rule, which would guarantee increasing wages, whenever the prices would go up 
over certain level.   The government did not control the wages in private companies at 
all. But the government controlled the general level of wages of state employees and 
through it actually the whole economy. 
 Reform in 1985 brought mach smaller wage changes than reforms in 1965 and 
1989. The enterprises supposed to be financially independent, but at the same the 
government still wanted to have crucial control over them.  Any general wage changes 
had to be consulted with government, and to receive the governmental approval was 
quite difficult.  Situation in individual wages was bit better. The managers supposed to 
be relatively independent in making decision about that.  The wages among individual 
workers at the same work place could be quite different. 10% different was quite normal.    
 In wage situation I think I can predict upon Czechoslovakian experiences 
possible outcome for North Korean reform. There is no doubt, that the changes in wages 
were positive sign of improving DPRK economy. It is not surprising that the 
government still holds the general control over the wages and from Czechoslovakian 
experiences; we can see that positive outcome can come even with this limitation.  
As I already mentioned the crucial changes that we can see is that North Korea 
changed its attitude about prices. In some sense it actually means that at least 
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theoretically North Korea left the socialistic theory and started with the capitalistic at 
wage system field. There is no other way, how can be explained that workers received 
payment for their individual performances and no for collective performances.  
But as it can be seen from Czechoslovak experiences (mostly from reform in 
1985) the theoretical rhetoric changes were not enough. The real differentiations among 
workers and enterprises had to be introduced for a large positive effect.  
Czechoslovakian reform in 1965 as well as Czechoslovakian reform in 1989 proved that 
the new wages system were only important part of the reforms. It had to be done, but on 
the other hand without others steps such as independency in decision making it could 
not work.  
The changes, which Pyongyang introduced in wage, would have according to 
Czechoslovak experiences positive effect.  Actually the positive effect can be seen from 
the latest data from DPRK.  If we look exactly at the steps, which were introduced in 
the reforms in Czechoslovakia and North Korea both countries introduced mostly 
similar steps but used different level. According to these levels the final effect of DPRK 
reform can be seen again somewhere between the Czechoslovakian outcomes from 
1985 reform and 1965 reform.  I believe the outcome should be closer to 1965 results 
than the 1985 results. 
 I believe there are many other reforms steps, which can be compared between 
reform in North Korea and reforms in Czechoslovakia such as abolishing Donpyo or 
creating “new” special economic zones etc.  (Czechoslovakia in 1980ties also used 
special dollars voucher similar to Dunpyo. It was called “BON”).  I just wanted to pick 
up the most crucial ones for the economy and tried to compare them relatively deeply.  
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CONCLUSION 
     As it can be seen from reform in 1965 or from reform in 1989 in 
Czechoslovakia, changing in planning strategies had really positive effect on 
profitability of companies. But this change which brought high independency among 
enterprises had to be followed by other steps such as new wage system, new accounting 
system etc.  But the crucial was how much independency the enterprises received from 
the central planning committee.  
In reform from 1985 the independency, which companies got, was much smaller 
than in 1965 and even smaller than in 1989.  In 1968 the profitability was number one 
in importance. The level of freedom, which supposed to be delivered to management, 
was quite close to independency. The reform in 1965 was expecting total independency 
in calculating prices followed by new tax system. The plan from 1985 was much 
conservative in that case. The tax system should not change at all; also independency in 
price creation was very limited.  
If we look on the results of the reforms in Czechoslovakia, the effect of reform 
in 1985 was much smaller than the effect from 1965 and of course smaller than reform 
in 1989.I believe the reform, which DPRK introduced in 2002 is somewhere between 
Czechoslovak reform in 1965 and Czechoslovak reform in 1985. North Korea opened 
its economy in 2002 more than Czechoslovakia in 1985, but less than Czechoslovakia in 
1965.  Because of this I can predict the effect of the reform somewhere between the 
results of Czechoslovak reform in 1965 and 1985.  
But of course the final prediction about the effect cannot be made only upon 
these Czechoslovak experiences, because there are also some differences between these 
two countries, which should be considered. For North Korean economy is for example 
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very important current Chinese growth rate and its demand. So in conclusion I can say 
the changing of planning system with all following changing should have quite positive 
effect on North Korean economy. From long term point of view the government will 
have to give up more of its control over the enterprises, to maintain the growth rate, but 
according to Czechoslovakian experiences the steps which were introduced in North 
Korea should have significant at least short and mid term positive effect over the 
economy.   
 
 
PART VII. 
CURRENT SITUATION IN NORTH KOREA 
If my prediction about at least the short-term effects of the reform in North 
Korea are correct, and if it is possible to use Czechoslovakia for comparison, can be 
seen from current situation in North Korea. The true is that North Korean economy has 
been increasing in last two years. This is actually what I have been predicting by this 
thesis. The question, which should be answer first, is why? Is it because of the reform or 
are there other reasons? What most of the economists says there are several reasons for 
the recovery?  I would like to talk about three - I believe the most important. The 
reasons are: First - Reform in 2002, Second - Current situation in China and Third - 
Humanitarian aid.  
Probably the biggest reason is the reform, introduced in July 2002. (But it is 
fair to say that the economy was very slightly increasing already before the reform in 
2001. Reasons for this increasing can be seen in massive humanitarian aid from abroad.) 
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2002 reform was a reform in good direction and big enough to have at least a short term 
positive effect on the economy.   
The first months of the reforms especially between July 2002 and July 2003 
were very painful. Inflation was rampant, as the boost in demand created by the increase 
in wages could not be met by adequate supply. Also the free market exchange rate 
nearly tripled. A new word was introduced to North Korean economy – unemployment. 
Unemployment went up. Some even quite large enterprises collapsed. Some enterprises 
attempt to renege on the price increased. Because of loss of KEDO fuel oil, the energy 
availability decreased.  
After first year of pain the situation improved quite rapidly. The market system 
started to work energetically.  Many Chinese investors came to Korea. New enterprises 
were created (the biggest boom is expecting in Gaesong economic zone after its 
opening). The state budget was used to upgrade infrastructure and repair industries. 
Also demand from China for raw material and other goods went up as well as export. 
The latest estimates say that the economy grew by 6 % in 2003. The Ministry of 
Finance announced that Industrial output went up by 10%, Electricity generation went 
up by 21%, Electricity generation went up by 21%, and Iron ore by 46% and Cement 
went up by 27%.   
 But not only industry, but also agriculture went up in recent years.  The main 
factor behind this continued recoveries include favorable weather conditions, especially 
at the beginning of the season, a relatively low incidence of crop pests and diseases and 
increased application of fertilizer provided through international assistance. This year 
cereal production, including potatoes in cereal equipment, is forecast at 4.16 million 
tones, the best harvest over the last nine years, and 4.7 percent larger than last year’s 
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revised estimate. But instead of that the domestic production still fall far bellow the 
minimum food needs and the country will again have to depend on substantial external 
food assistance as its capacity to import commercially remains highly constrained. 
Second reason for DPRK good economic numbers can be seen as it has been 
indicated in China. North Korea can be characterizing such a country where nothing 
grows fast. But instead of that the China – DPRK trade – both exports and imports have 
been growing at estimated 40-50% per annum (Table 5.) Annual trade in 2004 is 
expected to be close to 1.2 billion USD, it means about 50% of all trade. The Chinese 
demand for everything is just huge at the moment.  North Korea is flooded by requests 
from Chinese wishing to come to exploit its abundant resources and reinstate industry.  
North Korea quite welcomes this demand, but does not want to sell the key assets to the 
Chinese now.  Also the exchange rate seems to be on quite realistic level now, which 
made the business much easier. The current exchange rate is about 1150 NK WON per 
1 USD. Only because of Chinese rapid growth, North Korean economy should be lifted 
up by 5 – 6% another year. At the moment China is for North Korea trade partner 
number one.      
  Third reason for North Korea recovery, which I want to talk about, can be seen 
in huge aid, which is provided by foreigner countries, mainly by South Korea during 
these years (Chart 5.) Through the humanitarian aid North Korea get some foods and 
other staff, which is North Korea short of. This has of course positive effect on the 
economy.  Huge humanitarian aid goes to North Korea this year. After the train tragedy 
at Ryongchon in April 2004, South Korea has promised to send there extra 
humanitarian aid worth 30 millions USD.  In late May 2004, North Korean leader Kim 
Jong-Il met with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi.  Koizumi came back to Japan with 
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five of the eight family members of the five repatriated Japanese abductees. Kim Jong-Il 
agreed to let them go after Japan offered 250.000 tons of food and medical material 
worth 10 millions USD. The relationship between North Korea and Japan till that time 
was very cold. After this deal there is quite a high chance the relationship will improve.  
North Korea can only benefit from that.  
 
PART VIII. 
PREDICTION ABOUT FUTURE, TASKS AHEAD  OF DPRK 
If the homogenous similarities between these two countries will follow and if the 
entire conclusion, which I already made, is correct – the next similarity, which should 
occur logically, is the fail of the regime. The question which should be asked now is: 
“Can we expect similar end of communistic regime in DPRK as it had happened in 
Czechoslovakia?” I do not think so. I do not think this similarity will continue on this 
field. Why?  If I compared the reforms, I have found that there were many similar initial 
conditions which actually led to similar results. So simply when ever there were similar 
initial conditions and similar reforms steps we could expect similar outcomes.  
But this condition is not meet if we compare the initial political conditions 
before the velvet revolution in 1989 in Czechoslovakia, which brought the termination 
of the regime, and current situation in North Korea.  Because there were not same initial 
conditions, we cannot expect that the regime in North Korea can finish by the same way 
as regime in Czechoslovakia finished. 
There are generally two ways how to change the regime – slow changing – 
something like China, or shock end - exactly what happened in Czechoslovakia. The 
regime in Czechoslovakia failed in 1989 because of several reasons. I want to talk about 
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two only, which I believe differentiate Czechoslovakia and North Korea very clearly 
and can explain why shock therapy will not happen in North Korea.    
The first reason we can see in political situation in other socialistic countries 
around Czechoslovakia. In fall 1989 the biggest political changes of regimes were 
happening in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Also situation in 
Rumania, Bulgaria and other eastern European socialistic countries   were about the 
change of the regime.  Czechoslovakia was only a part of this massive transformation. 
The other reason we can see in existence of underground opposition. The initial 
step of the Velvet revolution, which brought the changes of the regime, was made by 
underground opposition. It happened on November 17th 1989. The large opposition 
demonstration was held back by armed police. They brutally hearted several unarmed 
people - mostly students. But the police nobody killed. It was too massive 
demonstration and the regime could not hush it up. The ordinary people were in shock 
from police behavior and massive demonstration and general strikes occurred shortly 
after this happened.  
If we look in North Korea none of these two very important conditions really 
exists at the moment. There are no other countries around DPRK, which are expecting 
to change the regime soon and which should be able to influence by this change people 
in DPRK. May be if a rapid change of the regime and massive demonstration which 
finally overcome the Communists in China would happened, it could influence the 
situation in DPRK. But it does not seem to be realistic at the time. It seems that Chinese 
Communistic party has the state under total control and this cannot be really expected.   
Also compare to Czechoslovakia there is not really any opposition in North 
Korea.  In the Czechoslovakia there was quite large underground opposition, which 
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finally started the revolution. But in NK there is not this element.  As far as I know if 
there is any opposition in North Korea it is separated small organizations, rather 
individuals. There are not many demonstrations against the regime. The people are just 
quiet. If there is an opposition demonstration in NK I believe the regime is prepared to 
shoot in the crowds and put all the people in prison.  Nobody would really complain. 
The media under state control would not say anything about the incident; most of the 
people would not get the information.  
In Czechoslovakia it was not possible. There were demonstrations quite often 
and of course the police victimized the underground opposition. But the state had some 
limits which it could not go beyond. The regime would for example not survive if at any 
demonstration the police would start to shoot in the crowds.  There were radio stations 
such as Voice of America or Free Europe, which would inform about it and the regime, 
would not be able to maintain this. It is quite interesting that the state collapsed actually 
after the police gruel about 100 people only.  
Situation in NK is absolutely different than was in Czechoslovakia in 1989. The 
country is totally isolated and it seems to me that the regime can do what ever it wants. 
Because of that I do not really believe the shock therapy and revolution can come in 
North Korea to change the system at least not in near future. The army seems to be very 
loyal right now and will support Kim Jong-Il regime if there is any needs.  
I believe biggest influence on North Korean future have and will have China at 
least from short term. At the moment it is the biggest North Korean friend and the North 
Koreans can see that the economy in China is running quite well, and the communistic 
regime has still the control over the state. I think this is exactly what North Koreans 
leaders would like to have also. Because of that if we want to predict future 
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development in North Korea we should look at China and their steps in the past.  I 
believe that it is what more less we can expect in North Korea. An example which 
proves this statement can be seen in North Korean economic zones, which are about to 
start now (at least the one near Gaesong). These zones had been designed in quite 
similar way as the Chinese ones. Kim Jong-Il during his last visit in China in May 2004 
visited at least one Chinese special economic zone and was collecting experiences from 
its running. I believe if North Korea will be at least relatively successful with their 
zones, other steps, which introduced China recently will follow. 
The tasks which are ahead of North Korea are relatively clear. The reform which 
was introduced on July 1st 2002 was good direction reform, but we should believe it was 
beginning only.  From economic point of view the economy must be soon or later open 
more. Steps already introduced will be not enough from long term point of view.  For 
example the ownership of the economy has to be changed from state own enterprises to 
private enterprises.  Situation in legal framework has to be more improved. Foreign 
investors need basic legal framework, which would guarantee them the investments are 
secured and will not be nationalized. The infrastructure has to be also rapidly improved. 
The state has to invest lots of money to phone network, electric power network as well 
as in roads. The state will have to guarantee also some basic frame work of human 
rights to its own people, which would guarantee that the big investors which would 
make a business in DPRK will not be accusing from supporting slave regime etc.  
The previous paragraphs described how the NK economy changed and what can 
be expected from the economy in the future. But we should also ask how the reform 
changed the people and what can be expected from them? Has the reform changed the 
people or not? I believe yes.  Reforms in Czechoslovakia in 1965 and 1989 changed the 
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people relatively much.  The democratization process could be seen everywhere and it 
had of course an influence on Czechoslovak inhabitants. The reforms brought freedom 
for the enterprises, price etc. The people saw it. The people were part of it and were 
influenced by those changes. The people could not be eliminated from that. They 
received bit of democracy and tried to use it.  For example an employees threatening by 
strike during the negotiations about wages were before 1965 reform actually impossible. 
Nobody would even think about it. There was a plan and it set up everything.  In 1968 it 
happened in Czechoslovakia several times.  
 I believe North Korea knows what the side effects of introduction of market 
reforms are. I think North Korea will try to eliminate this democratization as much as 
possible.  That is actually one of the reasons why North Korea does not really speed up 
with its reforms.  
For North Korea future development are not crucial only the economic factors, 
but political factors also. There are two political factors which I believe may influence 
the future of North Korea very significantly. One of the factors is short term factor one 
and one is long term factor.  The short one is the current nuclear crises and long one is 
Korean Unification.  
 
NUCLEAR CRISES 
The result of the nuclear crises will influence the economy quite rapidly.  After 
the second round talks in Beijing this spring it seems much more optimistic than it 
looked few months before.  The question is again why? I see two possible explanations:  
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Possibility one – “North Korean is in bad situation now and really needed to 
solve the problem.” I do not really think so. According to what I just said the situation 
in NK is not that bad as it was earlier.  
Possibility two: “North Koreans feel that now is the best time for negotiation and 
for giving up its nuclear program.” Now they can get as much benefit as possible.  The 
economy is in relatively positive direction; Chinese growth is expecting to continue. 
With additional help from US and other countries in exchange for stopping of the 
nuclear program, the economy may recover relatively well. There are presidential 
elections in USA soon and the settlement about NK nuclear crises can help Mr. Bush in 
presidential election so I believe also USA want the settlement about the nuclear issue 
now.   Because of that I think it is the right time for terminating the nuclear crises and 
settle down the deal. 
 
 
KOREAN UNIFICATION 
One of the solutions how to solve the situation in DPRK can be Unification 
between North and South Korea. This would have titanic effect to DPRK economy, 
actually much bigger than successfully solving of nuclear crises. But the probability of 
its happening is on the other hand much smaller than probability of ending the nuclear 
crisis. The possibility of Korean Unification rose mostly during the democratic changes 
in Eastern Europe. The experts thought that similar changes could happen in North 
Korea and Unification similar to German one can happened in Korean peninsula. From 
certain reasons which I already indicated it did not happened. At the moment it does not 
look that it will happen in near future, but may be in long term it would be possible. 
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There has been prepared several scenarios about what should be done if this 
happened. The gap between DPRK and South Korea economy is huge and it is clear 
that most of the reconstruction of DPRK would be lie on South Korean back. (Chart 6.) 
So from South Korean point of view it is good to be prepared for that.  The cost will be 
huge and South Korea will be not able to pay it in short time. The huge cost may slow 
down the South Korean economy as well as the living standards. Because of that South 
Korea should pre – invest to North Korea now and by this try to decrease the 
investments which will be necessary when the unification will happen.  It means to 
invest in North Korea now even if it is not profitable at the moment can save huge 
money in the future. 
It is also important to decide what to do in first days after the Unification. 
Should the North Korean be allowed to go to South or should they be forced to stay for 
certain period in North Korea? For the whole economy would be according to many 
scenarios the best solution if the North would not be allowed to settle down in South for 
certain period. While the economic situation in North will improve they would be able 
to travel south.        
 
PART IX. 
CONCLUSION  
It is extremely difficult to write about North Korea because there are not 
many information. And if there are some there is always a question how doubtful they 
are. Instead of that I believe I have used data and information, which can be relatively 
doubtful and trustful. I tried to use official published information by DPRK as well as 
many non North Korean sources which I hope eliminate the mistakes.  
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The task which I picked up is not easy at all. I tried to do something, what 
probably not many people before me did. I tried to connect two relatively different 
countries from different continents. But I hope I proved that North Korea is not as much 
different from Czechoslovakia as many people believe and the comparison can be done.   
I tried to use raw doubtful data and with simple logic tried to explain why something 
happened or why not.  When I tried to predict something for North Korea based on 
Czechoslovak experiences, I did it only when several conditions were met. I did it only 
when similar initial conditions occurred and when similar steps was creating.  If I have 
not found similar results usually at least one of the conditions was not met.   
I hope all the conclusions which I made are correct and can be accepted by a 
reader I am not saying that the entire conclusions which I am presenting are perfectly ok 
and   there cannot be future discussion about them. I just believe I just showed   my 
logic way why I believe this or that was wrong or this or that may happen in the future.  
To predict any future for North Korea is extremely difficult. The state is 
much closed and nobody really knows what is happening inside. One of the latest news 
says the North Korean leader banned using of mobile phones and that a nearly 3 meters 
high fence will be built on the border with China. These kinds of news are against all 
the logics which are normally used for prediction about country development and seems 
do not have economically reasonable explanation. Because nobody can be really sure 
what will happen in North Korea tomorrow, this thesis has certain limitation in its 
prediction about NK future.    
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TABLES AND CHARTS: 
Czech Republic 
Top of Page  
Population: 
 
10,249,216 (July 2003 est.)  
Government 
type:  parliamentary democracy  
Capital: 
 
Prague  
GDP: 
 
purchasing power parity - $157.1 billion (2002 est.)  
GDP - real 
growth rate:  2% (2002 est.)  
GDP - per 
capita:  purchasing power parity - $15,300 (2002 est.)  
 
 Korea, North 
Top of Page  
Population: 
 
22,466,481 (July 2003 est.)  
Government type: 
 
authoritarian socialist; one-man dictatorship  
Capital: 
 
Pyongyang  
GDP: 
 
purchasing power parity - $22.26 billion (2002 est.)  
GDP - real 
growth rate:  1% (2002 est.)  
GDP - per capita:  
Purchasing power parity - $1,000 (2002 est.)  
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Chart 3 
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Chart 5 
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Chart 7 
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Chart 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Planned and Actual Production of Selected Industrial and Agricultural Products by Economic 
Plan, 1961-93 
(in millions of tons unless otherwise indicated) 
Product 1961-70  1971- 76  1978-84  1987-93 
 Planned Actual Planned A ctual Planned Actual Planned Actu al1
Electricity2 17.0 16.5 28-30 29.7 50-60 50.0 100.0 54.0 
Coal 25.0 27.5 50-53 55.0 70-80 70.0 120.0 83.0 
Steel 2.3 2.2 3.8 3.8- 4.0 7.4-8.0 7.4-8.0 10.0 6.9 
Cement 4.3 4.0 7.5-8.0 8.0 12-13 12- 13 22.0 13.0 
Chemical fertilizers 1.7 1.5 2.8-3.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 7.2 n.a. 
Textiles3 500.0 400.0 500-600 580 800 800 1,500.0 850.0 
Marine products 1.2 1.1 1.6-1.8 1.6 3.5 3.5 11.0 3.7 
Grains 6.6 5.0 7.0-7.5 8.0 10.0 10.0 15.0 10.0 
n.a.--not available. 
11988 figures. 
2In billions of kilowatt-hours. 
3In millions of meters. 
Productivity of workers in Czechoslovakia (%)
90
92
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100
102
19
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Table 2 
 
Value of Exports to Communist and Noncommunist Countries, Selected Years, 1984-90 
(in millions of United States dollars) 
 1984 1986 1988 1990 
Communist countries     
Soviet Union 447.9 642.0 887.3 1,047.4 
China 247.5 255.2 212.3 141.5 
Other 51.4 56.4 85.2 67.7 
Total communist countries 746.8 953.6 1,184.8 1,256.6 
Noncommunist countries     
Industrial countries     
Japan 131.1 154.3 293.3 271.2 
West Germany 135.1 64.1 41.0 50.7 Other 16.1 15.0 39.7 39.0
Total industrial countries 282.3 233.4 374.0 360.9     
Developing countries         
Africa 3.4 13.8 15.1 17.1     
Asia 62.6 87.3 173.6 175.2     
Middle East 13.4 4.6 3.9 2.5     
Western Hemisphere 2.1 4.5 36.6 44.9     
Total developing countries 81.5 110.2 229.2 239.7     
Total noncommunist countries 363.8 343.6 603.2600.6      
TOTAL 1,110.6 1,297.2 1,788.0 1,857.2     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
 
Value of Imports from Communist and Noncommunist Countries, Selected Years, 1984-90 
(in millions of United States dollars) 
 1984 1986 1988 1990
Communist countries     
Soviet Union 467.9 1,186.5 1,921.7 1,667.9
China 248.8 280.8 379.7 403.4
Other 53.6 55.1 78.6 84.5 
Total communist countries 770.3 1,522.4 2,380. 2,155.8
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Noncommunist countries     
Industrial countries     
Japan 279.4 203.7 262.7 193.7
West Germany 24.9 42.7 44.1 68.7 
Other 81.0 84.4 160.1 210.7
Total industrial countries 385.3 330.8 466.9 473.1
Developing countries     
Africa 1.8 2.3 11.2 2.5 
Asia 128.2 143.8 258.4 259.1
Middle East 2.5 14.5 6.1 3.1 
Western Hemisphere 1.7 8.3 44.2 26.2 
Total developing countries 134.2 168.9 319.9 290.9
Total noncommunist countries 519.5 499.7 786.8 764.0
TOTAL 1,289.8 2,022.1 3,166.8 2,919.8
 
 
Table 4 
 
Ten Major Targets and Interim Results for Third Seven-Year Plan (1987-93) by Sector 
(in millions of tons unless otherwise indicated) 
Sector Target for 1989 Results by 1989 Target for 1993
Electricity1 100.0 60.0 100.0 
Coal 120.0 70.0 120.0 
Steel 15.0 10.0 7.4 
Nonferrous metals 1.5 1.5 1.7 
Cement 20.0 12.0 22.0 
Chemical fertilizers 7.0 5.0 7.2 
Textiles2 1.5 0.8 1.5 
Marine products 5.0 3.1 11.0 
Grains 15.0 10.0 15.0 
Tideland cultivation3 300.0 n.a. 300.0 
n.a.--not available. 
1In billions of kilowatt-hours. 
2In billions of meters. 
3In hectares. 
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Table 5 
 
North Korea - Overseas Trade 
 
 
Source: KOTRA, Ministry of Unification 
 
Table 6 
 
 
Agrostroj Jicin, Economic performance  
year total production in Kcs socialistic countries marker in Kcs western marker in Kcs 
num. of 
employees 
1958 9,9 7,5 2,4 379
1959 10,2 8,2 2 400
1960 10 8,8 1,2 420
1961 9,8 8,8 1 420
1962 9,2 8,8 0,4 440
1963 9,3 8,9 0,3 455
1964 8,7 8,6 0,1 460
1965 9,2 8,7 0,5 430
1966 9,8 8,7 1,1 425
1967 9,9 8,75 1,15 425
1968 9,8 8,85 0,95 420
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002
1 China 166,797       270,863       570,660       467,309       737,457       738,172       27.6% 25.4%
2 South Korea 176,170       271,575       226,787       370,155       402,957       641,730       15.1% 22.1%
3 Japan 225,618       234,404       249,077       135,137       474,695       369,541       17.8% 12.7%
4 Thailand 24,098         44,616         105,964       171,966       130,062       216,582       4.9% 7.5%
5 India 3,060           4,768           154,793       186,573       157,853       191,341       5.9% 6.6%
6 Germany 22,756         27,799         82,077         140,418       104,833       168,217       3.9% 5.8%
7 Singapore 3,050           796              112,298       83,026         115,348       83,822         4.3% 2.9%
8 Russia 4,541           3,642           63,794         77,048         68,335         80,690         2.6% 2.8%
9 Hong Kong 37,974         21,940         42,555         29,169         80,529         51,109         3.0% 1.8%
10 Netherland 10,424         6,377           9,067           27,620         19,491         33,997         0.7% 1.2%
11 Bangladesh 37,701         32,267         1,275           490              38,976         32,757         1.5% 1.1%
114,189       87,520         228,731       206,640       342,920       294,160       12.8% 10.1%
826,378       1,006,567    1,847,078    1,895,551    2,673,456    2,902,118    100.0% 100.0%
CountryRanking
Others
Total
%Total ImportExport
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Table 7 
 
Czechoslovakia - economic performance 1966 - 1985 
 
net 
material 
product 
growth=  
net material 
gowth - 
plan% 
personal 
consumption 
growth % 
Gross 
investment %of 
national income
1966-1970 6,9 4,4 1 31
1971-1975 5,7 5,1 2 34
1976-1980 3,7 4,9 -0,5 33
1981-1985 4 7 3 32
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